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WHY SALMAN IS A GAME-CHANGER FOR 
THE POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE INDUSTRY 
KENDALL R. PAULEY* 
For decades, the political intelligence (PI) industry—an expert network of 
lobbyists and lawyers residing in Washington, D.C.—leveraged their personal 
connections to extract information from the government and then sell it to 
securities traders who could convert this insider-knowledge into substantial 
profits. This practice has evaded liability by exploiting two requirements for 
tipper-tippee liability:  a lack of fiduciary duty owed by government employees 
and an absence of a pecuniary exchange between government sources and the PI 
operative.  However, this Comment argues that now, the STOCK Act and 
Salman places the PI industry back within the scope of securities prohibitions. 
Although using analytics to inform investment decisions is a legal and 
essential component to the functioning of our financial markets, the analyzed 
information cannot be material, nonpublic information gathered in breach of a 
fiduciary duty. The PI industry claims to only gather and analyze publicly 
available information; however, it is clear from market data and government 
investigations that PI operatives utilize their personal connections and 
relationships to extract trading tips from government employees. 
 This practice may have been legally permissible in the past, but the 
combination of the STOCK Act and Salman now places some PI gathering 
technique in jeopardy.  First, the STOCK Act explicitly imputed a fiduciary duty 
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to government employees. Second, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Salman v. United States—rejecting the “pecuniary or similarly valuable 
nature” exchange requirement from the Dirks personal gain test—impacts the 
PI industry.  Salman reaffirmed Dirks in that the personal gain requirement 
could be satisfied by only the personal relationship between a tipper and a tippee, 
such as a friendship. 
This Comment analyzes the current state of the personal gain requirement 
after Salman and applies that analysis to likely scenarios confronting a PI 
operative. This Comment argues that, after the STOCK Act and Salman, some 
PI practices likely violate securities laws. Consequently, PI firms ought to 
evaluate their information gathering techniques, and hedge funds that consume 
PI should adopt new compliance procedures. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On November 15, 2005, USG Corp.’s shares experienced a two 
hundred percent increase in trading and a five percent surge in 
value—an unheard of growth in the usual day-to-day of Wall Street.1  
Yet oddly, USG, a building material supplier, had not released new 
financial information or public statements into the marketplace that 
day, which is the usual cause of high increases or decreases in trading.2  
If it is not the usual cause, a random flurry of excessive trading is 
typically a telltale sign of corporate insiders exploiting business 
information for their own personal gain; however, this time, the 
information emanated not from the boardroom but from Capitol Hill. 
The day after the surge in trading, it became clear that the 
information had emerged from private discussions regarding a 
potential congressional bill when Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist (R-
TN) promised a Senate vote on a bill that would create a public trust 
fund for asbestos liability claims.3  Such a fund had the potential to 
eliminate USG’s exposure to more than $3 billion of liability claims.4  
Although Frist claimed that an investigation yielded no evidence of any 
illicit communications by his staff, political intelligence (PI) 
operatives5—whose job is to collect information from government 
officials to then sell for profit—somehow extracted the material, 
nonpublic information and sold it to their clientele, hedge funds.6  
Those clients quickly capitalized on the information, precipitating the 
increase in the trading volume and reaping significant profits.7 
                                               
 1. Brody Mullins & Kara Scannell, Hedge Funds Hire Lobbyists to Gather Tips in 
Washington, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 8, 2006, 12:01 AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB116554698892944296.  A stock listed on the S&P 500 
during 2012 had a normal daily volatility of 0.7%.  See Morgan Housel, Is Today’s Market 
More Volatile than in the Past?, MOTLEY FOOL (Feb. 22, 2016, 10:34 AM), 
https://www.fool.com/investing/general/2016/02/22/is-todays-market-more-
volatile-than-in-the-past.aspx. 
 2. Eamon Javers, Washington Whispers to Wall Street, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, 
Dec. 26, 2005, at 42. 
 3. Mullins & Scannell, supra note 1. 
 4. Assoc. Press, USG to Settle Suits Related to Asbestos, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2006), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/31/business/usg-to-settle-suits-related-to-
asbestos.html. 
 5. See infra Section IV.A (describing the scope of PI operations). 
 6. See Mullins & Scannell, supra note 1 (suggesting a relation between the 
dramatic stock price increases and Senator Frist’s announcement). 
 7. Meng Gao & Jiekun Huang, Capitalizing on Capitol Hill:  Informed Trading by 
Hedge Fund Managers, 121 J. FIN. ECON. 521, 522 (2016) (indicating that traders who 
were guided by political intelligence traded before the announcement). 
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More than a decade later, this asbestos insider trading scheme 
remains relevant because it exemplifies the lucrative market for PI.  
The PI industry has avoided liability from their most nefarious acts by 
exploiting two gaps in tipper-tippee insider trading prohibitions:  
(1) the lack of a fiduciary duty for government employees and (2) the 
legal requirement that there must be a pecuniary personal benefit. 
However, the enactment of a relatively new statute and a recent 
change in jurisprudence now fulfill these two missing elements.8  First, 
Congress enacted the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act 
(STOCK Act) in 2012 as a response to scandals concerning 
congressional members,9 and this Act imputes a fiduciary duty to 
government employees.  Second, in securities law, impermissible 
gifting of material, nonpublic information previously required a 
reciprocal “personal benefit” with the prospect of a pecuniary gain or 
similar nature.10  But on December 6, 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Salman v. United States11 rejected this requirement and held that a 
“personal gain” to a tipper may be inferred merely from the personal 
relationship between the tipper and tippee.12  Together, the STOCK 
Act and Salman now encompass all those who utilize their personal 
connections to gather material, nonpublic information from 
government insiders—namely, the PI industry.13 
This Comment argues that the personal gain requirement 
articulated in Salman, in connection with the STOCK Act, will curtail 
                                               
 8. Similar to the asbestos trading scheme, on April 2, 2013, trading within the 
health-care insurer industry experienced a 3.7% to 5.5% increase in the final minutes 
of trading.  Brody Mullins, Grassley Wants Answers on ‘Political Intelligence,’ WALL ST. J. 
(Apr. 4, 2013, 5:44 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2013/04/04/grassley-wants-
answers-on-political-intelligence.  An hour after the markets closed, the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services publicly announced “a change in how the 
government pays private insurers to run Medicare health plans for seniors and the 
disabled.”  Id.  In the end, traders profited approximately $662 million from the receipt 
of insider government information.  Id. 
 9. Deirdre Walsh, Obama Signs STOCK Act to Address “Deficit of Trust” in Washington, 
CNN (Apr. 4, 2012, 2:45 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/04/04/politics/stock-act-
signing/index.html. 
 10. A tipper is a person who conveys material, nonpublic information to a tippee.  
A tippee is a person who receives material, nonpublic information.  Dirks v. SEC, 
463 U.S. 646, 655–56 (1983). 
 11. 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016). 
 12. Id. at 425 (holding that “a gift of confidential information to anyone, not just 
a ‘trading relative or friend,’ is enough to prove securities fraud”). 
 13. Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-105, §§ 3–
4, 126 Stat. 291, 292 (to be codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.). 
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PI operatives’ ability to gather information from the government 
through insider tactics.  As a result, PI firms will need to rely only on 
public information and analytics, and hedge funds, the predominant 
consumers of PI, should be wary and implement prophylactic 
measures to avoid insider trading liability.  Further, this Comment 
argues that the recent United States v. Martoma14 decision from the 
Second Circuit is inconsistent with Salman.  Therefore, this Comment 
serves as a guide for the courts to continue to conceptualize and 
identify factors within a close personal relationship between a tipper 
and tippee.  Part I explores the origins of insider trading, and Part II 
discusses the circuit split leading to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Salman.  Part III then surveys case law to identify factors, without the 
presence of any direct pecuniary gain, in a tipper-tippee relationship 
that satisfy the post-Salman personal gain requirement.  Part IV 
introduces and explains the STOCK Act and the PI industry.  Finally, 
Part V analyzes the PI industry and determines whether, and under 
what circumstances, some of the industry’s tactics violate securities laws 
in the wake of the STOCK Act and the Salman decision. 
I.  THE STATE OF INSIDER TRADING 
Insider trading prohibitions spring largely from judicial decisions 
construing the anti-fraud securities provisions rather than from 
statutory or regulatory developments.15  The Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) and Department of Justice (DOJ) enforce these 
prohibitions through enforcement actions and criminal 
prosecutions.16  Although the SEC is the principle securities market 
regulator, often federal prosecutors also enforce the most egregious 
instances of insider trading; thus the SEC and DOJ are both the 
catalysts for developing federal insider trading jurisprudence.17 
The SEC commenced the first insider trading enforcement as a 
response to fraudsters who originated from within a company and 
exploited the company’s stockholders.18  However, the SEC later 
sought to fulfill its mandate under the Securities Act of 1933 (“the ’33 
                                               
 14. 869 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 15. See infra Section I.A (outlining the foundation and evolution of U.S. securities laws). 
 16. See James J. Park, Rules, Principles, and the Competition to Enforce the Securities Law, 
100 CALIF. L. REV. 115, 154 (2012). 
 17. Id. 
 18. See infra Section I.B (exploring the motivations and intent behind the adoption 
of insider trading laws). 
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Act”)19 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“the ’34 Act”)20 to 
protect investors by expanding the scope of liability to fraudsters acting 
beyond the boardroom.21  Accordingly, the government22 advanced 
several theories of liability with mixed success to reach the outer 
bounds of statutory prohibitions on insider trading.23  In that vein, one 
of the major theories the SEC promoted focused on capturing those 
who trade on information provided to them through a tip in exchange 
for a personal benefit.24  Insider trading laws are thus critical to the 
integrity of the securities markets because they act as a deterrent to 
would-be fraudsters, including those lurking within the PI industry. 
A.  Origins of Federal Securities Law 
The ’33 Act and the ’34 Act were legislative responses to the stock 
market’s collapse during the Great Depression.25  Concerned with 
“ineptitude and/or chicanery” among stockbrokers and investment 
bankers, Congress passed this sweeping legislation to restore 
confidence in the markets and encourage investment.26  As part of the 
’33 Act, Congress created the SEC and authorized it to promulgate 
rules to protect the public, maintain fair and efficient markets, and 
promote capital formation.27 
                                               
 19. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. § 77a (2012)). 
 20. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78a). 
 21. See infra Section I.B (explaining the implicit prohibition of trading by anyone 
in possession of material, nonpublic information). 
 22. Because of the overlap between the DOJ’s and the SEC’s roles in developing 
insider trading liability theories, this Comment uses “government” throughout to 
mean either the SEC or DOJ. 
 23. See infra Sections I.B.1–2 (explaining the adoption and implications of the classical 
and misappropriation theories, a foundation for understanding tipper-tippee liability). 
 24. See infra Section I.B.3 (articulating how the courts apply tipper-tippee liability, 
an essential concept impacting the PI industry). 
 25. See Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 385–86 (1990) (arguing that Congress’s intent in passing the 
’34 Act was to prevent speculation in securities by drawing security prices away from 
investment value, rather than its prevailing use today). 
 26. See generally id. at 408–13 (detailing the downfall of the market throughout the 
1920s and explaining that “[f]or Congress[,] . . . short selling was the chief villain” and 
a main regulatory purpose of the Exchange Act); Stop Trading on Congressional 
Knowledge Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-105, §§ 3–4, 126 Stat. 291, 292 (to be codified 
in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.). 
 27. What We Do, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/article/ 
whatwedo.html (last modified June 10, 2013). 
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Securities take the form of various financial instruments and provide 
investors—whether they are individuals saving for retirement or hedge 
funds—the means to generate passive income with uncommitted 
capital.28  The name of an instrument is not determinative of its 
classification as a security; courts instead look to the substance and 
“economic reality” of the instrument.29  At its foundation, a security is 
an investment contract30 in a common enterprise31 that would be 
expected to yield profit32 solely33 from the efforts of a promoter or a 
third party.34  The primary sale35 of securities allows businesses to raise 
capital, which in turn stimulates the economy.36  Moreover, the ability 
to buy and sell a security on an open market is essential for capital 
                                               
 28. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012) (broadly defining a security as “any note, stock, 
treasury stock, security future, security-based swap, bond, debenture, . . . investment 
contract . . . or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing”). 
 29. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298, 300 (1946). 
 30. Id. at 298–99 (“An investment contract . . . [is] a contract, transaction or 
scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to 
expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party . . . .”). 
 31. See SEC v. SG Ltd., 265 F.3d 42, 49, 53 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding that a website 
offering investors to pay into virtual companies satisfied the common enterprise prong 
because the investors shared “horizontal commonality,” which is “the pooling of assets 
from multiple investors so that all share in the profits and risks of the enterprise”). 
 32. See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975) (noting that 
an expectation of profits is one derived from “either capital appreciation resulting 
from the development of the initial investment . . . or a participation in earnings 
resulting from the use of investors’ funds”). 
 33. See SEC v. Merch. Capital, LLC, 483 F.3d 747, 755 (11th Cir. 2007) (applying 
the Williamson factors, which examine the degree of control an investor has to 
determine whether the efforts are solely from a third party or promoter); Williamson 
v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 424 (5th Cir. 1988) (recognizing that there are situations 
where a “general partnership interest” may qualify as an investment contract if the 
general partner retains little ability to control the profitability of investment). 
 34. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. at 296. 
 35. A primary transaction is when the issuer offers and sells its own securities to 
investors, while a secondary transaction is when one investor resells securities of the 
issuer to another investor.  STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION 
9–11 (4th ed. 2015). 
 36. See SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N IPO TASK FORCE, REBUILDING THE IPO ON-RAMP:  
PUTTING EMERGING COMPANIES AND THE JOB MARKET BACK ON THE ROAD TO GROWTH 1 
(Oct. 20, 2011), 
https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsec/rebuilding_the_ipo_on-ramp.pdf 
(explaining the importance of the Initial Public Offering (IPO) in allowing companies 
to “generate new jobs and revenue for the U.S. economy”). 
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formation.37  Recognizing this, the SEC began promulgating regulations 
to ensure fair and free markets for securities after their initial sale.38 
B.  The Development of Insider Trading Prohibitions 
Under the ’34 Act, the SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5,39 which 
prohibits individuals from engaging in deceptive practices connected 
with the purchase or sale of securities.40  The DOJ and SEC broadly 
applied Rule 10b-5 to cover a wide variety of deceptive practices.41  
Notably, the ’34 Act does not define insider trading, even though the 
term is used in the Act to discuss liability and civil penalties.42  Although 
lacking a statutory definition, the SEC and the courts construe Rule 
10b-5 to implicitly prohibit insider trading.43 
Generally, insider trading law prohibits trading of material,44 
nonpublic information45 when the trader breaches a duty of trust or 
                                               
 37. Id. at 3. 
 38. Since the ’33 Act, Congress has passed several laws to expand the reach of the 
SEC and to promote capital formation; most recently, Congress passed the Jumpstart 
Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act) to encourage capital formation of small 
businesses.  Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 
306 (providing that the Act’s purpose is “[t]o increase American job creation and 
economic growth by improving access to the public capital markets for emerging 
growth companies”).  In passing the JOBS Act, Congress “intended to ease access to 
capital and investments for emerging growth companies and through crowdfunding.”  
Office of the Press Sec’y, Statement by the Press Secretary on H.R. 3606, WHITE HOUSE, 
(Apr. 5, 2012), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/04/05/ 
statement-press-secretary-hr-3606. 
 39. See C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2016) (prohibiting fraud, deceit, and the omission or 
falsification of material facts in connection with the purchase or sale of any security). 
 40. Id.  Rule 10b-5 also provides investors with a private right of action against 
fraudsters.  See J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432–33 (1964) (ruling that the ’34 Act 
implies a private right of action and reasoning that “the possibility of civil damages or 
injunctive relief serves as a most effective weapon [for] enforcement” of securities laws). 
 41. Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971) 
(“Section 10(b) must be read flexibly, not technically and restrictively.”). 
 42. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78t-1, 78u-1 (2012). 
 43. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653–54 (1983) (noting that inside trading 
is within Rule 10b-5 because it is deceitful to stockholders and unfair to the public 
without disclosure). 
 44. A fact is material if it would create a “substantial likelihood that the disclosure 
of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having 
significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.”  TSC Indus. v. 
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). 
 45. “[N]onpublic information is information that either is not publicly available 
or is sufficiently more detailed and/or reliable than publicly available information to 
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confidence owed to the information source,46 the security issuer, or the 
company shareholders.47  Thus, despite its title, a fraudster does not 
have to be a corporate insider to commit insider trading.48  Insider 
trading law implicitly prohibits trading of a security by anyone in 
possession of material, nonpublic information in violation of a fiduciary 
duty.49  A trader armed with this type of information needs to disclose 
it to the public to trade lawfully in that security.  Of course, in practice, 
this never happens.50  Presently, three theories underpin insider 
trading prohibitions:  classical, misappropriation, and tipper-tippee.51 
1.  The classical theory of insider trading 
Under the classical theory, a corporate insider is prohibited from 
trading securities based on material, nonpublic information that the 
individual obtained through his or her affiliation with the 
corporation.52  Corporate insiders include not only officers, directors, 
and controlling stockholders, but also all actors who hold fiduciary 
duties to a corporation, such as attorneys and consultants.53  The 
rationale supporting this theory is that the corporate actors breach 
their fiduciary duties of trust to their company’s shareholders by 
exploiting corporate information for personal gain.54 
                                               
be deemed significant, in and of itself, by reasonable investors.”  United States v. 
Contorinis, 692 F.3d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 46. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664–65; see also SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 50 (2d Cir. 
2009) (holding that cases of affirmative deceit, where a device is employed to “trick, 
circumvent[,] or bypass,” fall within the ambit of 10b-5). 
 47. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) (affirming that a duty to 
disclose arises when there exists a “relationship of trust and confidence”). 
 48. See infra notes 68–71 and accompanying text. 
 49. See infra notes 52–54 and accompanying text. 
 50. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654. 
 51. See Kenneth R. Davis, Insider Trading Flaw:  Toward a Fraud-on-the-Market Theory 
and Beyond, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 51, 53 n.5, 57 (2016) (distinguishing the three current 
theories).  “Classical theory” is synonymous with “traditional theory.”  United States v. 
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651 (1997).  This Comment refers to it only as classical theory. 
 52. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 651. 
 53. Id. at 652 (citing Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655 n.14 (1983)); Cady, Roberts & Co., 
Exchange Act Release No. 34,6668, 40 SEC Docket 907, 913 (Nov. 8, 1961). 
 54. See Karen Schoen, Insider Trading:  The “Possession Versus Use” Debate, 148 U. PA. 
L. REV. 239, 240 (1999) (exploring the debate between whether 10b requires the 
plaintiff to provide factual support that the defendant actually used insider 
information to execute a trade or whether it is sufficient to find that a defendant 
knowingly possessed the information while executing the trade). 
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In 1961, the classical theory found its footing when the SEC initiated 
an administrative proceeding against Cady, Roberts & Co.55  In Cady, 
Roberts & Co.,56 the SEC held both a director of a company and his 
broker liable for insider trading after the director ordered his broker 
to short his shares57 in anticipation of a public announcement 
regarding declining future dividends.58  Following its mandate under 
the ’34 Act, the SEC reasoned that the defendants deceived the 
company’s shareholders by exploiting material, nonpublic 
information and concluded that the defendants should have disclosed 
the inside information prior to trading in the company’s securities.59  
The classical theory continues to be the fundamental rationale behind 
prohibiting insider trading; however, it permits insider trading by 
those unaffiliated with the company who acquire confidential 
information from their trusted sources within the company.60 
2.  The misappropriation theory 
In contrast to the classical theory, the misappropriation theory holds 
liable persons who misuse confidential information to trade securities 
if the person simultaneously owes a duty of trust to the source of that 
information.61  Under this theory, it is impermissible for the principal 
to use information for a self-serving purpose that deprives the principal 
of the exclusive use of that information.62  The misappropriation 
                                               
 55. For a discussion on the development of the classical theory, see generally 
Comment, Broker Silence and Rule 10b-5:  Expanding the Duty to Disclose, 71 YALE L.J. 736, 
747 (1962), which explores the prominence of the Cady decision in providing clarity 
to section 10b of the ’34 Act, and Comment, Investors Management Company and Rule 
10b-5–The Tippee at Bay, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 545, 561 (1972), which argues that the ruling 
in Cady was justified, but left unclear the requirements of tippee liability. 
 56. Exchange Act Release No. 34,6668, 40 SEC Docket 907 (Nov. 8, 1961). 
 57. Short selling is when a trader “borrow[s] shares from other investors and 
sell[s] them in the hope of buying them back lower at a discount.”  Chris Dieterich, 
So, You Want to Short Shares of Snap, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 3, 2017, 10:25 AM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2017/03/03/so-you-want-to-short-shares-of-snap. 
 58. See Cady, 40 SEC Docket at 911 (determining that a failure to disclose insider 
information constituted a violation of anti-fraud provisions). 
 59. The Commissioners noted that without the ’34 Act, insider trading may not 
fall within the common law notions of fraud.  Id. at 912. 
 60. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227–28 (1980). 
 61. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997). 
 62. Id. at 652.  A principal is a person or entity, who by mutual consent, appoints 
and controls an agent who owes a fiduciary duty to the principal to undertake an action 
on behalf of the principal.  See DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS:  
AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND LLCS 1 (4th ed. 2012) (describing an agency relationship 
between an agent and a principal). 
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theory extends the reach of insider trading prohibitions by 
encompassing individuals who are not corporate officers or directors.63 
The Supreme Court adopted the misappropriation theory in United 
States v. O’Hagan.64  In that case, the respondent, James O’Hagan, was 
a partner of the law firm Dorsey & Whitney, where he learned that the 
firm’s client, Grand Met, was going to make a tender offer65 to acquire 
Pillsbury Company.66  O’Hagan traded on this information and profited.67 
The SEC filed an enforcement action alleging that although 
O’Hagan was not a traditional corporate insider, he defrauded his 
employer by using confidential information from its client for his own 
                                               
 63. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653 (holding that the misappropriation theory applied 
even though the parties involved were not officers or directors). 
 64. 521 U.S. 642, 653 (1997).  The misappropriation theory almost never came to 
fruition.  See generally CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 35, at 364 (recounting the genesis 
and survival of the misappropriation theory in Supreme Court jurisprudence).  In 
1987, the Supreme Court had initially denied certiorari to Carpenter v. United States, 
which first questioned the validity of the misappropriation theory.  484 U.S. 19 (1987) 
(4-4 decision), superseded by statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012).  Justice Powell drafted a 
dissent arguing that the misappropriation theory was inconsistent with insider trading 
precedent.  Id. (draft dissent of Powell, J.) (No. 86-422, Dec. 10, 1986) (rejecting the 
misappropriation theory and arguing that because the petitioners did not owe a 
fiduciary duty to the seller of the securities, they could not be guilty of insider trading).  
After the draft letter was circulated among the justices, the Court decided to grant 
certiorari; however, Justice Powell retired before its rehearing, and his successor, 
Justice Kennedy, had not been confirmed in time to join the decision.  See CHOI & 
PRITCHARD, supra note 35, at 364.  The Carpenter decision was 4-4, which left intact the 
lower court’s decision.  See CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 35, at 364.  But see Randall 
W. Quinn, The Misappropriation Theory of Insider-Trading in the Supreme Court:  A (Brief) 
Response to the (Many) Critics of United States v. O’Hagan, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 
865, 868 (2003) (arguing that the misappropriation theory is consistent with statutory 
and regulatory schemes of securities laws). 
 65. A tender offer is a corporate takeover technique that involves a broad solicitation 
to all equity shareholders for a fixed-price that is typically at a premium over the market 
price.  The offer is also often for a substantial number of shares, held open for only a limited 
amount of time, and is generally contingent upon shareholders tending a fixed number of 
units.  Fast Answers:  Tender Offers, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/ 
answerstenderhtm.html (last modified Jan. 16, 2013). 
 66. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 647. 
 67. O’Hagan purchased over 2500 unexpired call options and over 5000 common 
shares of Pillsbury stock.  After Grand Met announced its tender offer, shares jumped 
from $39 per share to $60 per share, and O’Hagan netted a profit of more than $4.3 
million.  Id. at 647–48; see also Saumya Vaishampayan, Options Traders Bet on Big Swing 
from Netflix, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 15, 2015), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2015/04/ 
15/options-traders-bet-on-big-swing-from-netflix (“A [call] option confers the right to 
[buy] the underlying stock at a specific price, called the strike price, by a certain time.”). 
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benefit.68  The Supreme Court applied the misappropriation theory, 
reasoning that Rule 10b-5 aims to protect the integrity of securities 
markets against abuses by those who acquire insider information from 
their employment relationship.69  Further, the Court agreed that the 
misappropriation theory is within the penumbra of 10b-5’s “deceptive 
device or contrivance” because the trader exploited the principal’s 
trust for personal gain, thereby defrauding the principal.70  Finally, the 
Court concluded that it would make “scant sense to hold a lawyer like 
O’Hagan [as] a section 10(b) violator if he works for a law firm 
representing the target of a tender offer, but not . . . the bidder.”71  
Consequently, the misappropriation theory expanded the SEC’s reach 
beyond traditional corporate insiders. 
3.  Tipper-tippee liability 
The third theory of insider trading derives from the classical and 
misappropriation theories and is important because it reaches 
fraudsters who might otherwise escape liability by acting through 
others.72  Tippees of corporate insider information are generally liable 
under section 10b-5 because they have a duty not to profit from the use 
of insider information that they knew, or should have known, was 
confidential and originated from a corporate insider.73  This theory of 
liability is viewed as a general extension of an “after the fact” breach of 
the insider’s fiduciary obligations.74 
The Supreme Court addressed tipper-tippee liability in Dirks v. 
SEC.75  Ronald Secrist, a former employee of an equity company, 
sought to expose fraudulent management with the help of Raymond 
Dirks, an investment analyst.76  Dirks conducted an extensive 
investigation, discovered the company’s fraud, and then contacted a 
                                               
 68. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 648. 
 69. Id. at 652–53. 
 70. Id. at 653. 
 71. Id. at 659. 
 72. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983) (identifying scenarios in which 
behavior can be excused under the classical or misappropriation theories). 
 73. See Davis, supra note 51, at 77 (arguing that securities laws ought to protect the 
counterparty of a trade by prohibiting trading while in possession of material, 
nonpublic information obtained by any methods, thus abandoning any necessity for a 
breach of a fiduciary duty). 
 74. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659. 
 75. 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
 76. Id. at 649 (informing Dirks that Equity Funding of America vastly overstated its 
assets due to fraudulent practices). 
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reporter to publicize his findings.77  However, before the Wall Street 
Journal published the story, Dirks informed several of his clients who 
invested in the company that a fraud was afoot.78  The clients then used 
the information to execute timely trades, avoiding substantial 
monetary losses.79 
The Supreme Court applied a four-part test to determine whether 
tipper-tippee liability applied to Dirks’s conduct.  The four factors were 
whether (1) the insider-tipper breached a fiduciary duty by providing 
the material, nonpublic information to a tippee; (2) the tipper realized 
a personal benefit from providing the information to the tippee; (3) 
the tippee knew, or should have known, the tipper breached his 
fiduciary duty; and (4) the tippee used the information in connection 
with a securities transaction.80  The Court inferred tippee liability from 
the insider-tipper’s breach of a fiduciary duty; thus, the Court required 
the government to prove that the tipper violated a duty.81  Further, the 
Court focused on the information from the original tipper because, if 
such a breach exists, this original tip taints all subsequent tippees who 
receive the information.82  In other words, if a tipper violates a 
fiduciary duty by communicating a tip to a tippee and that tippee in 
turn transmits the tip to other persons, the law attaches liability to each 
“remote tippee” who knew, or should have known, that the original 
exchange was illicit.83 
Applying the test, the Supreme Court found that Secrist received no 
personal benefit from tipping Dirks because Secrist’s sole motivation 
was to expose fraud.84  The Court acknowledged this laudable goal of 
exposing fraud and held that such a noble motive was a lawful 
conveyance of nonpublic information.85  The Court defined a personal 
                                               
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 649 (at least five of Dirk’s clients liquidated their holding of more than 
$16 million). 
 80. Id. at 662–64. 
 81. See id. at 659, 661–62 (“[T]ippee’s duty to disclose or abstain is derivative from that of 
the insider’s duty . . . .  And absent a breach by the insider, there is no derivative breach.”). 
 82. See Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 427–28 (2016) (finding a tippee 
liable for insider trading by focusing on the tipper’s breach of his fiduciary duty when 
the tipper shared tips with his brother, who then shared those tips with the tippee). 
 83. See id. (holding that Salman was liable as a “remote tippee” because he knew 
Michael, the tippee, received tips from Maher, the tipper who breached his fiduciary duty). 
 84. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 667. 
 85. See id. (“We conclude that Dirks, in the circumstances of this case, had no duty 
to abstain from use of the inside information that he obtained.”). 
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benefit as “a pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will translate 
into future earnings” as well as “a gift of confidential information to a 
trading relative or friend.”86  However, the Court cautioned that 
deciding whether an insider personally benefited is a fact-intensive 
inquiry and thus not an easy question.87  Finally, the Court 
recommended that the SEC promulgate additional rules to help 
define the personal benefit requirement.88 
The SEC failed to heed the Supreme Court’s suggestion and never 
promulgated regulations describing the personal benefit 
requirement.89  Without guidance from the SEC, courts have been left 
to grapple with Dirks’s description of a personal benefit.90  
Unsurprisingly, a circuit split emerged.91 
II.  THE PERSONAL BENEFIT REQUIREMENT 
The Dirks personal benefit requirement provided a workable 
framework that remained in harmony amongst the circuits for 
decades.  However, within the past few years, this area of the law has 
been in flux.  Starting in 2014, the Second Circuit added an additional 
                                               
 86. Id. at 663–64. 
 87. Id. at 664. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See generally David T. Cohen, Note, Old Rule, New Theory:  Revising the Personal 
Benefit Requirement for Tipper/Tippee Liability Under the Misappropriation Theory of Insider 
Trading, 47 B.C. L. REV. 547, 565 (2006) (arguing that for misappropriation cases, 
courts should require a showing that the tipper was reckless as to whether (1) he or 
she would either benefit personally or harm to the information source; and (2) 
whether somebody else would trade on the information). 
 90. See generally United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 447–48 (2d Cir. 2014) 
(explaining that the court had not yet “been presented with the question of whether 
the tippee’s knowledge of a tipper’s breach requires knowledge of the tipper’s 
personal benefit,” but finding that a personal benefit requires a prospect of pecuniary 
gain), abrogated by Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 422 (2016) (holding that a 
personal benefit does not have to be a pecuniary gain). 
 91. See Carmen Germaine, Appeals Courts Still Lost in Post-Newman Trading Muddle, 
LAW360 (May 27, 2016, 11:48 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/801331/ 
appeals-courts-still-lost-in-post-newman-trading-muddle (commenting on the 
widening post-Newman circuit split and the need for clarity from the Supreme Court 
or Congress on the requisite elements and essential evidence to find liability).  Compare 
Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 427 (noting that the Ninth Circuit held that the tipper “breached 
a duty because he made a ‘gift of confidential information to a trading relative’”) 
(quoting United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2015)), with Newman, 
773 F.3d at 448 (finding that a tipper had to breach a duty and have some prospect of 
pecuniary gain). 
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safeguard, the pecuniary requirement, to the Dirks personal benefit 
requirement.92  Just two years later, the Supreme Court restored the 
Dirks personal gain requirement to its original state in Salman v. United 
States.93  Ironically, in an about face shortly after Salman, the Second 
Circuit eviscerated the Dirks personal gains requirement in United States 
v. Martoma by fundamentally altering the Salman decision.94  The 
Martoma court held that a tipper realizes a personal benefit when the 
tipper merely intends to provide a tip with the intent that the recipient 
will trade on it—without examining the objective facts evidencing a 
close personal relationship between the tipper and tippee.95  The 
Second Circuit reasoned in Martoma that Salman altered the analysis of 
Dirks because it emphasized that a gift of information is tantamount to 
the tipper trading on the information and gifting the proceeds.96  The 
Martoma decision contravenes the Supreme Court’s holding in Salman 
because the Court in Salman expressly limited their holding to only 
rejecting the pecuniary exchange requirement, stressed the 
importance of the relationship between the tipper and tippee, and 
incorporated the reference “trading relative or friend” numerous 
times in the decision.97  Consequently, the Salman personal gains 
requirement remains good law in most jurisdictions, and the rationale 
of Martoma lies on uncertain grounds at best.98 
A.  The Newman Decision 
In United States v. Newman,99 the Second Circuit100 articulated a more 
nuanced reading of the personal gains requirement by finding that a 
tipper must have a prospect of pecuniary gain relatively 
contemporaneous with the conveyance of a tip.101  This holding 
illustrates a problem with prosecuting more remote tippees as courts 
                                               
 92. See infra Section II.A. 
 93. See infra Section II.B. 
 94. See infra Section II.C. 
 95. See infra Section II.C. 
 96. See infra Section II.C. 
 97. See infra Section II.C. 
 98. See infra Section II.C. 
 99. 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), abrogated by Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016). 
 100. See generally Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 762 (1975) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that the Second Circuit is the “Mother 
Court” of securities law). 
 101. Newman, 773 F.3d at 446. 
618 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:603 
 
struggle to find a logical break in the “daisy chain” of tips.102  In 
Newman, the government alleged that two portfolio managers—Todd 
Newman and Anthony Chiasson—violated Rule 10b-5 by trading on 
material, nonpublic information they knew, or should have known, 
could have only come from a person who breached his or her fiduciary 
duties owed to his or her employer.103 
At trial, the government presented evidence that a group of financial 
analysts exchanged information they obtained from company 
insiders.104  These analysts then passed the information to Newman and 
Chiasson, who executed trades in Dell and NVIDIA stock, earning 
profits of approximately $4 million and $68 million, respectively.105  
Newman and Chiasson were several steps removed from the Dell106 and 
NVIDIA107 corporate insiders, and there was no evidence that either of 
them knew the source of the inside information.108  The defendants 
moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that there was no evidence 
that the corporate insiders provided confidential information in 
exchange for a personal benefit.109  The Southern District of New York 
                                               
 102. The “daisy chain” problem is where a tip is transferred several times over, akin 
to a game of telephone, and the government must prove that the ultimate tippee knew, 
or should have known, of the tipper’s breach of a fiduciary duty.  Franklin A. Gevurtz, 
The Overlooked Daisy Chain Problem in Salman, 58 B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP. 18 (2017), 
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol58/iss6/3 (acknowledging that there is a 
“daisy chain problem” in Newman and Salman, and that the Court must further 
articulate how the personal benefit element will factor into illegal tipping chains). 
 103. Newman, 773 F.3d at 442. 
 104. Id. at 443 (“Specifically, the Government alleged that these analysts received 
information from insiders at Dell and NVIDIA disclosing those companies’ earnings 
numbers before they were publicly released in Dell’s May 2008 and August 2008 
earnings announcements and NVIDIA’s May 2008 earnings announcement.”). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Regarding the Dell tipping chain, evidence established that a Dell investor 
relations employee tipped Dell’s earnings information to a Neuberger Berman analyst, 
Goyal, who gave the information to a Diamondback analyst, Tortora.  Tortora relayed 
the information to Newman and a Level Global analyst, Adondakis.  Chiasson then 
received the information from Adondakis, “making Newman and Chiasson three and 
four levels removed from the inside tipper, respectively.”  Id. 
 107. For the NVIDA tipping chain, Choi, an employee of NVIDIA’s financial unit, 
attended church with Lim.  Choi tipped Lim, who then passed the information to his 
co-defendant, Kuo, an analyst at Whittier Trust.  Kuo then circulated the information 
to the group of analyst friends, including Tortora and Adondakis.  They in turn gave 
the information to Newman and Chiasson—making Newman and Chiasson four levels 
removed from the inside tippers.  Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 444. 
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denied the defendants’ motion and instructed jurors that if they found 
“that the ‘defendants traded on material, nonpublic information they 
knew insiders had disclosed in breach of a duty of confidentiality,’” the 
jurors could find the defendants guilty.110  The jury convicted Newman 
and Chiasson on all counts.111 
The Second Circuit overturned the jury verdict on the ground that 
the jury instruction was erroneous.112  The court held that a tippee 
could only be liable if (1) the tipper breached a fiduciary duty;113 
(2) the tipper received a personal benefit in exchange for the disclosure; 
and (3) the tippee knew, or should have known, of the breach.114  
Amplifying the personal benefit prong, the Second Circuit held that 
there must be a “meaningfully close personal relationship that 
generates an exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents 
at least a potential gain of pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.”115 
Newman sparked a debate among the securities bar.116  Some 
commentators praised Newman as an appropriate counterweight to the 
growing zealous prosecutions against securities traders alleged to have 
benefited from insider information.117  Other commenters argued that 
                                               
 110. Id. at 444, 447 (citation omitted). 
 111. Id. at 444. 
 112. Id. at 442. 
 113. Id. at 447; see also Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980) (noting 
that there is a “general duty between all participants in market transactions to forgo 
actions based on material, nonpublic information”). 
 114. Newman, 773 F.3d at 447. 
 115. Id. at 452 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Jiau, 734 F.3d 147, 153 (2d 
Cir. 2013) (holding that the exchange between an insider and the recipient should 
take the form of a “quid pro quo” to properly confer a benefit)). 
 116. See Reed Harasimowicz, Note, Nothing New, Man!—The Second Circuit’s 
Clarification of Insider Trading Liability in United States v. Newman Comes at a Critical 
Juncture in the Evolution of Insider Trading, 57 B.C. L. REV. 765, 787–88 (2016) (arguing 
that Newman was consistent with precedent and served to rein in prosecutorial 
overreach).  Compare Tebsy Paul, Comment, Friends with Benefits:  Analyzing the 
Implications of United States v. Newman for the Future of Insider Trading, 5 AM. U. BUS. L. 
REV. 109, 109–10 (2015) (agreeing that the Newman decision was proper and that the 
broad interpretation of 10b-5 has damaged the overall efficiency of the market by 
limiting the incentives of market participants to obtain information and make 
informed trading decisions), with Laura Palk, Ignorance Is Bliss:  Should Lack of Personal 
Benefit Knowledge Immunize Insider Trading?, 13 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 101, 147 (2016) 
(critiquing the Newman decision as being inconsistent with Congress’s intent to 
empower the SEC with broad discretion to define securities fraud). 
 117. See Opinion, Accountability for Preet Bharara, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 10, 2016, 7:11 
PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/accountability-for-preet-bharara-1457655074 
(summarizing the Southern District of New York’s denial of the government’s motion to 
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Congress intended the ’34 Act to protect the public interest by allowing 
the SEC to broadly define securities fraud.118  Newman had at least two 
reverberations:  first, it added an additional qualifier to Dirks’s personal 
gain requirement; and second, it precipitated a number of challenges 
to earlier insider trading convictions.119 
B.  The Salman Decision 
While the government had challenged Newman following the 
Second Circuit’s decision, the Supreme Court denied certiorari, which 
left the Second Circuit’s decision in place.120  Then, just one year later, 
the Ninth Circuit in Salman addressed the same issue of personal gain 
within the context of tipper-tippee 10b-5 liability.121  The Supreme 
Court’s unanimous decision in Salman revitalized the broad holding in 
Dirks and reaffirmed the power of the SEC to regulate the markets.122 
Unlike Newman, the tipping chain in Salman was intra-family.123  In 
2002, Bassam Salman’s future brother-in-law, Maher Kara, joined 
                                               
dismiss an alleged malicious prosecution case brought by a hedge fund manager against 
former U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara; the hedge fund manager’s previous securities 
conviction was reversed by the Second Circuit for lack of evidence of wrongdoing). 
 118. See Katherine Drummonds, Note, Resuscitating Dirks:  How the Salman “Gift 
Theory” of Tipper-Tippee Personal Benefit Would Improve Insider Trading Law, 53 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 833, 834 (2016) (critiquing the Newman decision because it unduly strained 
prosecutors and limited the SEC’s broad interpretation that allowed prosecutors to 
enforce the laws and encourage efficient markets). 
 119. See, e.g., United States v. Steinberg, 21 F. Supp. 3d 309, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) 
(denying Michael Steinberg’s motion for acquittal after a jury in the Southern District 
of New York found Steinberg, a former portfolio manager of SAC Capital Advisors who 
was in the same tipping chain as Newman, guilty of reaping $1.9 million in illegal 
profits; the court sentenced him to three-and-a-half years in prison); see also Ahiza 
Garcia & Evan Perez, Insider Trading Charges Dismissed Against Michael Steinberg, 6 Others, 
CNN (Oct. 22, 2015, 8:52 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/10/22/news/michael-
steinberg-insider-trading-charges-dismissed (dismissing Steinberg’s conviction 
because the Second Circuit found that the tipping chain in Newman did not amount 
to an illegal tip under the pecuniary gain requirement). 
 120. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 
242 (2015). 
 121. See United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1088 (9th Cir. 2015), aff’d, 137 S. 
Ct. 420, 424 (2016). 
 122. See Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 424 (holding that the court properly applied Dirks); 
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 667 (1983) (concluding that the defendant had no duty to 
abstain from use of inside information because he lacked a connection to the 
corporate insider and there were no objective facts or circumstances that the insider 
received a personal benefit). 
 123. Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 423–24. 
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Citigroup’s healthcare investment banking group and began to share 
his job experiences with his older brother, Michael Kara.124  Between 
2004 and 2007, Mahar discussed various aspects of his job, including 
pending mergers and acquisitions, several times with Michael, whom 
he suspected was trading on the information.125  During this time, 
Salman and Michael grew closer to each other,126 and Michael began 
to pass tips he received from Mahar along to Salman.127  At trial, 
brokerage records revealed that Michael and Salman’s trading 
patterns matched one another, yielding a profit of over $1.5 million.128 
The trial testimony revealed a “very close relationship” between the 
two Kara brothers.129  Michael was the best man at Maher’s wedding to 
Salman’s sister, and Mahar testified that he tipped Michael to “help 
him.”130  Michael, though, never reciprocated with any financial benefit 
to Mahar.131  Trial testimony highlighted the interconnectedness among 
Salman, Michael, and Mahar and showed that Salman knew that the 
tips Michael shared with him originated from Mahar.132  Based on this 
evidence, the jury convicted Salman of securities fraud.133 
In his appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Salman argued that the district 
court disregarded the teachings of Newman and did not consider the 
relationship between the tipper and tippee, which required “an 
exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents at least a 
potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.”134  
Reasoning that Dirks required only a fiduciary breach by sharing 
confidential information with a friend or relative, the Ninth Circuit 
declined to follow Newman and affirmed Salman’s conviction.135  The 
circuit split made this issue ripe for certiorari. 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Salman to address the issue 
of whether a contemporaneous pecuniary gain is required for tipper-
                                               
 124. Id. at 424. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 425. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. (citing United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2014)). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
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tippee liability.136  Salman argued that a “tangible monetary profit” was 
a prerequisite to tipper-tippee liability137 and that liability based solely 
off of a personal connection would spawn indeterminate and 
overbroad prosecutions.138  Seeking to extend the reach of the Ninth 
Circuit’s holding in Salman, the Government countered that “a tipper 
personally benefits whenever the tipper discloses confidential trading 
information for a noncorporate purpose.”139  Therefore, a gift of 
confidential information to anyone would constitute an exploitation of that 
information and the tipper would always realize a personal benefit.140 
In reaffirming Dirks, the Supreme Court determined that there is no 
practical difference between providing an insider tip to someone and 
giving that person the profits of an illegal trade.141  The Court noted 
that “Dirks specifies that when a tipper gives inside information to a 
‘trading relative or friend,’ the jury can infer that the tipper meant to 
provide the equivalent of a cash gift.”142  In essence, the Court rejected 
Newman’s “pecuniary or similarly valuable nature” requirement but 
notably did not adopt the Government’s argument for liability to 
extend to all noncorporate disclosures.143 
C.  The Martoma Decision 
Drawing on Salman, the Second Circuit used Martoma as a vehicle to 
revisit another panels’ decision in Newman.144  The holding in Salman 
was narrow and rejected only the need to show that the tipper received 
                                               
 136. Id. at 426 (2016).  But see John L. Potapchuk, Comment, The Sky is Not Falling, 
Todd Newman:  The Ninth Circuit Endorses a Measured Reading of Newman’s Definition of 
Personal Benefit for Insider Trading Liability in United States v. Salman, 57 B.C. L. REV. E. 
SUPP. 139, 140–42 (2016), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol57/iss6/9 
(arguing that Salman and Newman are reconcilable and together illustrate the difference 
between friends and family for the purposes of establishing tipper-tippee liability). 
 137. Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 426. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 428. 
 143. Id.  Further, the Court readily dismissed Salman’s argument that common law 
fraud requires the defendant to obtain money or property, and the Court rejected 
Salman’s last argument that Dirks’s gift-giving standard is unconstitutionally vague.  Id.  
The Court opined that there may arise some factual circumstances where assessing 
liability for gift giving will be troublesome, but that it was a far cry from “shapeless . . . 
criminal prohibition.”  Id. at 428–29. 
 144. See id. at 428; United States v. Martoma, 869 F.3d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 2017). 
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something of a “pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.”145  Salman never 
addressed the “meaningfully close personal relationship” requirement 
because it was obvious.146  The tipping occurred between two brothers 
the Supreme Court described as “very close.”147  Thus, Salman was a 
relatively straightforward application and re-affirmation of Dirks. 
 But the Martoma case was entirely different.  Mathew Martoma, a 
hedge fund manager, paid for material, nonpublic information from 
doctors involved in clinical trials for a new Alzheimer’s drug.148  
Martoma paid those “consultants” upwards of $1500 an hour to report 
on the progress of the trials.149  Ultimately, Martoma learned from his 
consultants that there were “two major weaknesses” in the 
experimental drug.150  Acting on that inside information about the 
anticipated results of clinical trials, Martoma traded in shares of Elan 
and Wyeth in advance of the scheduled public announcement.151  His 
trading averted substantial losses and earned him a $9 million bonus.152 
Following his conviction for insider trading, Martoma appealed 
claiming that the jury instructions deviated from the Newman personal 
gain test.153  In the Second Circuit, Martoma argued that his $1500 an 
hour consultants did not receive a personal gain.154  Unremarkably, the 
court of appeals gave short shrift to this argument.155 
In affirming Martoma’s conviction, the Second Circuit, in a divided 
panel, concluded that while Salman did not expressly overrule 
Newman’s “meaningfully close personal relationship” requirement, 
Salman fundamentally altered the Dirks analysis.156  Chief Judge 
Katzmann explained that Salman characterized a gift of information as 
                                               
 145. Martoma, 869 F.3d at 80. 
 146. Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 428. 
 147. Martoma, 869 F.3d at 81 (quoting Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 424). 
 148. Id. at 61–62.  Martoma’s portfolio had “buying power of between $400 and 
$500 million.” Id. at 61. The consulting contracts expressly provided that the 
consultant was prohibited from providing confidential information, but in practice, 
this was a mere toothless safeguard.  Id. at 62. 
 149. Id. at 67. 
 150. Id. at 61–62. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 62–63. 
 153. Id. at 61. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 73 (noting that Dr. Gilman, chair of the safety monitoring committee for 
the clinical trial, provided “43 paid consultation sessions for which he billed $1000 an 
hour, [and] regularly and intentionally provided Martoma with confidential 
information” from the trial). 
 156. Id. at 69. 
624 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:603 
 
equivalent to a tipper trading on the information and then gifting the 
proceeds.157  The Martoma court reasoned that a gift of inside 
information with the belief that the recipient would trade on it was 
tantamount to a personal gain because the information was used for a 
non-corporate purpose.158 
In a vigorous dissent, Judge Pooler accused the majority of 
eliminating the personal gain requirement.159  The dissent argued that 
Salman only overruled Newman “‘[t]o the extent’ that it required an 
insider to ‘receive something of a pecuniary or similarly valuable 
nature’ as a result of giving a gift to a friend”160  and noted that Salman’s 
close examination of the relationship between two brothers, Michael 
Kara and Mahar Kara, was a needless inquiry if the Supreme Court had 
rejected the “meaningfully close personal relationship” 
requirement.161  Judge Pooler observed that the Supreme Court 
emphasized this point in Salman when it qualified the gifting 
requirement “nearly a half-dozen times” with the phrase “to a trading 
relative or friend”—a strong signal that the friend or family standard 
remains good law.162 
Martoma reads Salman far too broadly and uses its sweeping 
interpretation as a springboard to substantially weaken the personal 
benefit requirement.  Thus, the line between lawful and unlawful 
trading is blurred.163  The Dirks personal benefit requirement protects 
innocent actors because it requires the government to establish with 
objective facts that something of value was exchanged, whether 
immediately or in the future.164  Newman’s “meaningful close personal 
relationship” was meant to draw a line between tips that were intended 
as a gift versus inadvertent innocent disclosures.165  By focusing on the 
intent of the tipper, which can be established through circumstantial 
evidence—particularly in civil liability—Martoma undermines 
                                               
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 71, 81–82. 
 159. Id. at 74 (Pooler, J., dissenting). 
 160. Id. at 80 (citations omitted). 
 161. Id. at 80–81. 
 162. Id. at 84–85. 
 163. Id. at 86. 
 164. Id. at 76–78.  An innocent actor “is unlikely to receive a benefit from sharing 
information unless he or she knows the information is material and nonpublic.”  
Further, the rule places the tippee in a better position to know whether the disclosure 
is illicit based on the personal connection between the tipper and tippee.  Id. at 78. 
 165. Id. at 78. 
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Salman.166  Martoma’s holding that virtually any disclosure of 
information, regardless of the relationship between the parties, should 
be construed as providing a personal benefit ignores Dirks and 
eviscerates the concept of personal benefit as a marker between legal 
and illegal conduct.167 
Despite Martoma, the Supreme Court’s decision in Salman leaves lower 
courts outside the Second Circuit to consider the entire spectrum of 
potential personal gain.  That spectrum begins with tippers like Dirks, 
who gained nothing, and ends with tipper-tippees like the Kara brothers, 
who exchanged inside information to get rich.168 
III.  THE LINGERING QUESTION:  WHAT IS A CLOSE FRIEND? 
In the wake of Salman, a tippee may satisfy the personal gain 
requirement simply by being a close friend to the tipper.169  But what 
are the features of a close friendship?  The current state of 
jurisprudence on this question provides six main guidelines for 
prosecutors and practitioners. 
First, when examining whether a tipper has received a personal 
benefit, courts apply a totality-of-the-circumstances test.170  Second, 
courts generally find that a tip to a coworker or someone on equal 
footing in business yields a personal gain.171  Third, when a quid pro 
quo is not readily ascertainable, additional social ties between the 
tipper and tippee should be explored.172  Fourth, sharing a collegiate 
connection tends to be a substantial factor that shows a close 
                                               
 166. Id. at 77.  Civil liability requires only a preponderance of the evidence, a lower 
standard than beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. at 73. 
 167. Id. at 86 (reasoning that the majority’s reasoning “could cover nearly any 
disclosure, and thus eliminate the personal benefit rule entirely”). 
 168. See Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 427–28 (2016) (citing that the 
tipper in Salman personally benefited by helping his brother, but the tipper in Dirks 
did not personally benefit by exposing fraud). 
 169. Id. 
 170. See United States v. Riley, 90 F. Supp. 3d 176, 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), aff’d, 
638 F. App’x 56 (2d Cir. 2016) (explaining that even if none of the circumstances 
standing alone were sufficient, the totality of the circumstances demonstrated that the 
tipper anticipated a benefit), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 589 (2016). 
 171. See SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1280 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that the tipper 
expected to benefit by maintaining a good relationship with her coworker and partner 
in real estate deals). 
 172. See SEC v. Anton, No. CIV.A. 06-2274, 2009 WL 1109324, at *9–10 (E.D. Pa. 
Apr. 23, 2009) (finding that evidence of a lack of other social ties, such as social or 
personal friendship, demonstrated that tipper benefits had not occurred). 
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relationship.173  Fifth, the greater the duration and intimacy of a 
friendship, the more likely a relationship will qualify as a personal gain 
under Dirks.174  Sixth, if a relationship is merely professional, with no 
history of personal favors or any family or social connections, no 
personal gain exists.175  Each of these guidelines is explained in greater 
detail below. 
A.  District Courts Define Friendship 
When examining whether a tipper has received a personal benefit, 
courts apply a totality-of-the-circumstances test.176  In United States v. 
Riley,177 David Riley tipped his friend Matthew Teeple about several 
pending confidential tender offers.178  The Southern District of New 
York applied a totality-of-the-circumstances test to evaluate all of the 
surrounding personal benefits provided to the tipper, Riley.179  The 
court concluded that Riley and Teeple’s relationship was sufficient to 
establish a personal benefit under Dirks.  Teeple regularly met with 
Riley in San Jose, supported Riley’s side business, assisted him in his 
job search, and provided him with investment advice.180  This 
amounted to a quid pro quo relationship in anticipation of pecuniary 
gain.181  Looking at the symbiotic aspects of their relationship, the 
court found that all aspects of a friendship were in play. 
                                               
 173. See SEC v. Clay Capital Mgmt., LLC, 2013 WL 5946989, at *3–4 (D.N.J. Nov. 6, 
2013) (finding a close friendship where the tipper and tippee attended business school 
together, were brothers-in-law, and the tipper was the best man at the tippee’s wedding). 
 174. See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 486 F.3d 315, 319, 323 (7th Cir. 2007) (ruling 
that personal gain was found where the tipper and tippee had met as freshmen in 
college, talked daily, and had seen each other frequently). 
 175. See SEC v. Maxwell, 341 F. Supp. 2d 941, 949–50 (S.D. Ohio 2004) (holding 
that the defendant did not derive any personal benefit from disclosing material, 
nonpublic information to his barber). 
 176. See United States v. Riley, 90 F. Supp. 3d 176, 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), aff’d, 
638 F. App’x 56 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 589 (2016). 
 177. 90 F. Supp. 3d 176 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), aff’d, 638 F. App’x 56 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. 
denied, 137 S. Ct. 589 (2016). 
 178. Id. at 182.  Riley, the Vice President and Chief Information Officer at Foundry 
Networks, stayed in contact with his former colleague, Matthew Teeple, who worked 
as an analyst for the hedge fund, Artis Capital Management, in 2007.  After Riley and 
Teeple traveled to San Jose together, Artis changed its financial position in Foundry.  
Id. at 181–82. 
 179. Id. at 189. 
 180. Id. at 182, 186–89. 
 181. Id. at 189. 
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Courts generally find that a tip to a coworker results in the tipper 
receiving a personal gain.182  In SEC v. Yun,183 Donna Yun, a real estate 
broker, provided a stock tip184 to her coworker, Jerry Burch.185  The 
Eleventh Circuit held that the relationship between Yun and Burch was 
sufficient for a jury to find that Yun received a personal benefit.186  
Specifically, the court noted that the two were “‘friendly,’ worked 
together for several years, and split commissions on various real estate 
transactions over the years.”187  In sum, relationships where one person 
relies on another for potential pecuniary gain generally satisfy the 
personal gains test. 
However, in the context of former colleagues, additional personal 
ties between the tipper and tippee are needed when a quid pro quo is 
not readily ascertainable.188  In SEC v. Anton,189 Frederick Anton was 
the chairman of PMA Capital and allegedly tipped190 David Johnson, a 
former PMA executive and shareholder.191  The Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania rejected the SEC’s argument192 and held that the trial 
testimony failed to establish that Anton and Johnson were friends.193  
The court held that Anton did not expect any future benefit from any 
alleged tip.194  The court reasoned that the two defendants had no 
                                               
 182. See SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1280 (11th Cir. 2003) (finding that a jury could 
reasonably conclude that a tipper expected to gain from a tip given to someone the tipper 
had worked with for several years and had split commissions on real estate transactions). 
 183. 327 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 184. David Yun, the President of Scholastic Book Fairs, attended a senior 
management retreat where he learned that the company would post a loss for the 
quarter.  The company subsequently gave a public statement noting a revised 
downward forecast.  However, before the public announcement, he informed his wife, 
Donna Yun.  Id. at 1267–68. 
 185. Jerry Burch purchased nearly $20,000 of put-options on Scholastic’s stock 
before the announcement, leading to profits of $269,000.  Id. at 1268. 
 186. Id. at 1280. 
 187. Id. 
 188. SEC v. Anton, No. 06-2274, 2009 WL 1109324, at *1, *9 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 2009). 
 189. No. 06-2274, 2009 WL 1109324, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 2009). 
 190. The stock tip concerned an upcoming earnings report and information about 
the suspension of future dividend payouts.  In total, Johnson avoided a loss of $325,305 
due to the alleged tip.  Id. at *1–2. 
 191. Id. at *1. 
 192. The SEC contended that Anton’s knowledge of Johnson’s holdings and of the 
potential negative impact on earnings, coupled with Anton and Johnson’s “long 
history and personal relationship,” was sufficient for a jury to reasonably conclude that 
Anton could expect a personal gain.  Id. at *9. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
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social or personal relationship; Johnson had “been to Anton’s home 
only once, did not have Anton’s personal contact information other 
than his office phone number, and had never received a gift from 
Anton.”195  Finally, the court noted that Anton had not spoken with 
Johnson following the alleged disclosure, which supported the court’s 
conclusion that there was no personal gain.196 
Even if the tipper and tippee are not in the same business, their 
social relationship can be sufficient to infer a benefit.197  In SEC v. 
Sargent,198 Dennis Shepard tipped his dentist, Michael Sargent, about a 
merger and did not receive a direct financial benefit.199  Nevertheless, 
the First Circuit examined their relationship and noted that aside from 
their doctor-patient relationship, their families were close.200  The 
court concluded that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find a 
close friendship between them because Shepard “often went to 
Sargent for help” with his work duties, had referred over seventy-five 
patients to Sargent, and the two of them were generally “friendly.”201 
Sharing a collegiate connection also tends to show either the 
potential for a future quid pro quo or a gift to a tippee.202  In SEC v. 
Clay Capital Management, LLC,203 Scott Vollmar tipped his brother-in-
law, James Turner, who also was his former business school 
classmate.204  Additionally, Vollmar was the best man at Turner’s 
wedding, and the two exchanged over fifty phone calls during the tip-
                                               
 195. Id. 
 196. Id.  Unfortunately for Johnson, he settled with the SEC and paid a total of over 
$786,000 in civil penalties.  Id. at *2.  Similar to Anton, Johnson may have also been 
able to defeat the SEC’s claims by arguing that he did not receive a personal benefit. 
 197. SEC v. Sargent, 229 F.3d 68, 77 (1st Cir. 2000). 
 198. 229 F.3d 68 (1st Cir. 2000). 
 199. Dennis Shepard ran a consulting business and learned of a potential merger 
from his business partner, Anthony Aldridge, who sat on the board of a company 
involved in the merger.  Id. at 71–72, 77. 
 200. Id. at 77. 
 201. Id.  Shepard was a member of the local chamber of commerce and often went 
to Sargent to help procure funds for the chamber.  Id. at 72. 
 202. See generally Stephen J. Crimmins, Insider Trading:  Where Is the Line?, 2013 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 330, 347 (2013) (suggesting that “virtually any ‘friendship[,]’” including 
“[t]he simple fact they were college friends[,]” would satisfy the benefit requirement). 
 203. No. 2:11-CV-05020-DMC-JBC, 2013 WL 5946989, at *1 (D.N.J. Nov. 6, 2013). 
 204. Scott Vollmar worked for Autodesk as a director of business development and 
became privy to confidential information about Autodesk’s financial results.  Vollmar 
then disclosed information about Autodesk’s interest in potentially acquiring 
Moldflow to James Turner.  Turner then traded on this information, acquiring 
substantial profits.  Id. 
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giving period.205  The New Jersey District Court held that all of these 
circumstances sufficed to establish that Vollmar received a personal 
benefit from tipping Turner.206 
The Southern District of New York came to a similar conclusion.  In 
United States v. Rajaratnam,207 the court found that Rajiv Goel tipped 
Raj Rajaratnam,208 and Rajaratnam had sufficient personal 
connections with Goel to sustain Rajaratnam’s conviction.209  The court 
cited evidence such as the two meeting in business school and their 
families vacationing together as establishing a sufficient connection for 
a jury to infer a personal gain.210  Therefore, classmate or college bonds 
tend to be examined closely. 
The courts also examine the duration and intensity of a relationship.  
In United States v. Evans,211 Paul Gianamore, a Credit Suisse financial 
analyst, tipped his friend, Ryan Evans, about three pending tender 
offers.212  The two friends were freshman-year roommates at DePaul 
University, and they kept in touch through phone calls, emails, and 
visits while they both lived in Chicago following graduation.213  The 
Seventh Circuit concluded that a reasonable jury could find that 
Gianamore benefitted from his financial tip because it was made as a 
                                               
 205. Id. at *3. 
 206. Id. 
 207. 802 F. Supp. 2d 491 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d, 719 F.3d 139, 160 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 208. During his time as head of Galleon Management Co.’s hedge fund, Rajaratman 
participated in several insider trading schemes, including one that involved the receipt 
of insider information concerning an outside company’s financial dealings.  802 F. 
Supp. 2d at 495, 499–500. 
 209. Id. at 507. 
 210. Id. at 506–07, 512. 
 211. 486 F.3d 315 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 212. Id. at 318–19.  Evans’s primary argument was that his co-defendant, Gianamore, 
was acquitted of all charges; thus, no reasonable jury could acquit a tipper (Gianamore) yet 
convict a tippee using the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard.  Id. at 320. 
 213. Id. at 319. 
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gift to a close friend.214  Similarly, in United States v. Bray,215 John 
O’Neill, an executive at Eastern Bank, tipped a fellow Oakley Country 
Club member.216  The First Circuit affirmed Bray’s conviction, finding 
that the social ties were sufficient to infer a personal gain.217  The First 
Circuit pointed out that the two men knew each other for fifteen years, 
socialized together at their country club, dined at local restaurants, and 
Bray did favors for O’Neill’s son over the years.218 
If a relationship is merely professional, with no history of personal 
favors or any family or social connections, then a court is not likely to 
allow a jury to determine whether there was a personal gain.  In SEC v. 
Maxwell,219 David Maxwell provided a tip to his barber, Elton Jehn.220  
Jehn cut Maxwell’s hair for fifteen years, but Maxwell only knew Jehn 
by his nickname, “Al.”221  During Maxwell’s haircuts, they discussed 
“family and personal matters, as well as how things were going at 
[Maxwell’s company].”222  Concluding that Maxwell did not receive a 
                                               
 214. Id. at 323–25; see also SEC v. Sabrdaran, No. 14-CV-04825-JSC, 2017 WL 
2081339, at *1, *3, *9 (N.D. Cal. May 15, 2017) (sustaining the defendants’ conviction 
because the evidence supported a finding of the defendants’ “longstanding 
friendship” as determined by their frequent phone calls, emails, and Facebook 
messages to discuss developments in their lives, philosophy, and international travel 
plans to see one another); SEC v. Blackwell, 291 F. Supp. 2d 673, 682, 684, 692–93 
(S.D. Ohio 2003) (finding the relationship between the tipper and tippee to be 
sufficient because the tippee knew the tipper for over ten years; was a close confidant; 
was relied upon by the tipper to manage the office; received a $30,000, interest-free 
loan from the tipper; and went house-hunting with the tipper). 
 215. 853 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2017). 
 216. Id. at 22.  The court also noted that the Oakley Country Club in Watertown, 
Massachusetts, was a hotbed for criminal securities fraudsters.  Id. at 21–22, 22 n.1 
(citing United States v. McPhail, 831 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2016); United States v. Parigian, 
824 F.3d 5 (1st Cir. 2016)). 
 217. Bray, 853 F.3d at 27 (finding that their friendship, along with O’Neill’s 
expectation that the tip would help his reputation with Bray, was sufficient for the jury 
to conclude that O’Neill shared the tip for personal gain). 
 218. Id. at 22, 27.  The First Circuit also noted that Bray previously extended favors 
to the O’Neills, such as gifting O’Neill’s son his first set of golf clubs and a $1,000 check 
as a graduation present, and helping his son with internship and employment 
opportunities.  Id. at 22. 
 219. 341 F. Supp. 2d 941 (S.D. Ohio 2004). 
 220. Id. at 943–44.  David Maxwell was a senior executive at Worthington and knew 
of an upcoming tender offer to purchase his company.  Jehn, a self-employed barber 
of forty-five years, emptied his savings accounts and took out loans to help fund 
purchases of stock and call options of Worthington stock; after the announcement of 
the merger, Jehn profited nearly $192,000.  Id. at 943–45. 
 221. Id. at 943. 
 222. Id. at 943–44. 
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personal benefit, the Southern District of Ohio granted summary 
judgment.223  The judge reasoned that Maxwell did not stand to gain 
from disclosing material, nonpublic information because the parties 
had no agreement to split profits, held such different “stations in life” 
that Maxwell could not realize any reputational benefits, and there was 
no evidence of any familial or social relationship.224  Therefore, a 
professional relationship that lacks a social harmonic may be 
insufficient for a tipper to realize a personal gain. 
B.  Personal Gains Findings 
In sum, a few general guideposts have emerged to assess whether a 
personal connection is sufficient to infer a personal benefit post-
Salman.  First, when the tipper and tippee are coworkers and rely on 
each other’s efforts to transact business, a court is likely to find a 
personal benefit to the tipper.225  However, if the relationship is merely 
professional without any additional social gatherings or reliance on 
joint efforts for future advancement, then courts will likely find no 
personal benefit.226 
Second, with respect to social relationships, those spanning multiple 
years and involving inter-family gatherings typically meet the threshold 
of a personal benefit.227  Naturally, in these circumstances, the courts 
have noted that a quid pro quo situation may evolve over time as favors 
are exchanged, such as job prospects for the tippee’s child or future 
business between the tipper and tippee.228  Similarly, a fact finder may 
infer a gift of information when a relationship between two families is 
strong.229  Therefore, the personal gains test post-Salman can be 
satisfied because these types of relationships naturally spawn a future 
exchange or a gratuitous gift.230 
                                               
 223. Id. at 949–50. 
 224. Id. at 948. 
 225. See SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1280 (11th Cir. 2003); supra notes 182–87 and 
accompanying text. 
 226. See SEC v. Anton, No. 06-2274, 2009 WL 1109324, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 2009); 
supra notes 189–96 and accompanying text. 
 227. See Maxwell, 341 F. Supp. 2d at 948–49; United States v. Bray, 853 F.3d 18, 27 
(1st Cir. 2017). 
 228. See Bray, 853 F.3d at 22, 27; supra note 218. 
 229. See SEC v. Clay Capital Mgmt., LLC, No. 2:11-CV-05020-DMC-JBC, 2013 WL 
5946989, at *3 (D.N.J. Nov. 6, 2013). 
 230. Id. 
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Further, courts appreciate that friendships forged in college or 
graduate school tend to last a lifetime.231  For prior collegiate 
relationships, the courts discern a mix of both social bonds that could 
trigger the gifting rationale of Dirks—where instead of trading on illicit 
knowledge and then gifting the proceeds, one merely gifts the 
information—and a professional business relationship that may trigger 
the quid pro quo rationale.232  Therefore, prior collegiate relationships 
are strong indicia of a potential personal gain.233 
Finally, a customer relationship, by itself, is typically insufficient.234  
Courts recognize that customers expect a friendly and inviting 
experience.235  For example, with a barbershop or nail salon, customers 
may be more likely to visit the business if the barber or stylist shares in 
pleasant “small-talk” with customers.236  The courts recognize that these 
relationships are simply part of everyday commerce and do not, 
without more, meet the Dirks personal gains test.237 
IV.  WALL STREET TAPS K STREET 
Insider trading on material, nonpublic information originating from 
within the government poses a unique challenge to the prosecutors 
and the PI operatives who collect, analyze, and distribute PI to 
investors.  The PI industry arose when hedge funds sought to obtain a 
competitive advantage in the marketplace by obtaining nonpublic 
information about publicly traded companies.238  Congress attempted 
to prevent government insiders from exploiting nonpublic 
information for their own personal gain by passing the STOCK Act.239  
                                               
 231. See United States v. Evans, 486 F.3d 315, 319 (7th Cir. 2007); Clay Capital Mgmt., 
LLC, 2013 WL 5946989, at *3; United States v. Rajaratnam, 802 F. Supp. 2d 491, 506–
07, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d, 719 F.3d 139, 160 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 232. See supra notes 202–13 and accompanying text (providing examples of when 
college relationships lead to a determination of personal gain). 
 233. See id. 
 234. See SEC v. Maxwell, 341 F. Supp. 2d 941, 949 (S.D. Ohio 2004) (finding that 
additional factors beyond the mere client-professional relationship warrant a jury 
finding that the tipper personally gained from disclosing nonpublic information). 
 235. Id. at 943–44. 
 236. See, e.g., id. at 944–45 (showing that a barber and his patron engaged in 
conversation during the patron’s appointments). 
 237. Id. at 948. 
 238. See Javers, supra note 2, at 42 (noting that the PI business started with a few firms in 
the 1970s, but after hedge funds erupted, new clients with money started seeking out PI). 
 239. Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-105, 
126 Stat. 291 (to be codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.). 
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Although the STOCK Act made several contributions to combat the 
corrupt practices of some government insiders, the legislation remains 
woefully inadequate to fully empower law enforcement to carry out its 
statutory mandates.240 
A.  The PI Industry 
PI is the information gained through gathering and analyzing 
activities conducted by Congress, the White House, and federal 
agencies.241  PI firms then sell this information to financial analysts 
looking for an edge in the stock market.242  Less familiar to the general 
public but well known within the halls of Congress,243 PI is gathered 
through several channels, such as “briefings, meetings, committee 
hearings, public or nonpublic documents, personal conversations, and 
other communication.”244  PI operatives then analyze and sell the 
                                               
 240. See Danielle A. Austin, Note, We the People or We the Legislature?:  The STOCK Act’s 
Compromise Between Politically-Motivated Accountability and Keeping Congress Above the Law, 
42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 267, 290–91 (2013) (finding that many provisions of the STOCK 
Act lack methods of enforcement). 
 241. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-389, POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE:  
FINANCIAL MARKET VALUE OF GOVERNMENT INFORMATION HINGES ON MATERIALITY AND 
TIMING 1 (2013) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. PI is defined as: 
information that is derived by a person from direct communication with an 
executive branch employee, a Member of Congress, or an employee of 
Congress; and provided in exchange for financial compensation to a client 
who intends, and who is known to intend, to use the information to inform 
investment decisions. 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Pub. L. No. 112-105, 126 Stat. 291). 
 242. See Mullins & Scannell, supra note 1 (reporting that PI firms are “charging 
hedge funds between $5,000 and $20,000 a month for tips and predictions”). 
 243. See Brody Mullins & Susan Pulliam, Buying ‘Political Intelligence’ Can Pay Off Big 
for Wall Street, WALL ST. J., (Jan. 18, 2013), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB10001424127887324660404578202072713156116 (describing the emergence of the 
PI industry and the need for regulation). 
 244. See GAO REPORT, supra note 241, at 4 (noting that these communications are 
between a PI firm representative and an executive branch employee, a legislative 
branch employee, or a member of Congress).  From 2011 to 2012, Elizabeth Fowler, a 
top health-policy advisor to President Obama, met numerous PI operatives before a 
flurry of healthcare trading.  These meetings included one with a former colleague 
from the Senate Finance Committee staff, Shawn Bishop, who at the time was a senior 
vice president at the Marwood Group, a PI firm, and a meeting with representatives 
from T. Rowe Price that was set up by Capitol Street, yet another PI firm.  Tom 
Hamburger, Political Intelligence Firms Set Up Investor Meetings at White House, WASH. POST 
(May 26, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/political-intelligence-
firms-set-up-investor-meetings-at-white-house/2013/05/26/73b06528-bccb-11e2-
9b09-1638acc3942e_story.html. 
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information, typically in monthly subscriptions, to hedge funds.245  The PI 
industry is small but lucrative for the lobbyists and lawyers who have the 
connections to collect it and for the hedge funds that can afford it.246 
Hedge funds are hiring lobbyists because of their existing 
connections with Capitol Hill and the executive branch.247  Lobbying 
is the act of advocating on behalf of another for financial 
compensation to influence proposed government action.248  However, 
unlike lobbying firms that have to disclose which bills they are 
                                               
 245. See Mullins & Scannell, supra note 1 (describing how hedge funds hire lobbyists 
to acquire PI for a large monthly fee). 
 246. Id. (explaining that Elliott & Associates, D.E. Shaw & Co., and Angelo Gordon 
& Co. paid over $80,000 in fees to join a lobbying coalition to receive information on 
the progress of an asbestos bill); see also Catherine Ho, Trump Victory Could Mean Big 
Business for K Street, WASH. POST (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/powerpost/wp/2016/11/09/trump-blasted-lobbyists-on-the-campaign-trail-but-
his-victory-could-mean-big-business-for-k-street (noting that lobbying firms, which 
predominately preside on K Street in Washington, D.C., are anticipating a windfall of 
business due to the radical change in agenda between President Obama and President 
Trump); Brody Mullins & Susan Pulliam, Hedge Funds Pay Top Dollar for Washington 
Intelligence, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 4, 2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB10001424053111904070604576514791591319306 (citing Integrity Research 
Associates’ estimate that the PI industry is approximately a $100 million a year 
business).  See generally Martin Klotz et al., SEC Reaches Settlement with Political Intelligence 
Firm, but Does Not Charge Insider Trading, WILLKIE FARR & GALLAGHER LLP (Dec. 1, 2015), 
http://www.willkie.com/~/media/Files/Publications/2015/11/SEC_Reaches_Settle
ment_With_Political_Intelligence_Firm_But_Does_Not_Charge_Insider_Trading.pdf 
(noting how the SEC’s settlement deal with Marwood Group Research LLC, in which the 
PI firm had to pay $375,000 for not having policies to prevent the misuse of material, 
nonpublic information, may show the SEC’s increased willingness to settle in a post-
Newman world where it has become more difficult to prosecute PI firms for insider trading). 
 247. See Javers, supra note 2, at 42 (explaining the lucrative business of PI and how 
the hedge fund industry is utilizing it). 
 248. 2 U.S.C. § 1602(8)(A), 1602(10) (2012) (stating that lobbying includes 
influencing legislation, federal rules, executive orders, the administration of federal 
programs, or the nomination of persons to a Senate-confirmed position).  Although 
proponents of lobbying argue that the practice helps inform lawmakers in niche areas of 
laws in which they may be unfamiliar, advocacy groups on both sides of the aisle have 
long decried the practice as corrupt, resulting in legislation such as the Lobbying 
Disclosure Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-65, 109 Stat. 691 (codified as amended at 2 
U.S.C. §§ 1601–1614).  See Katharine Q. Seelye, Pro or Con, Lobbying Thrived, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 30, 2010, 8:11 PM), https://prescriptions.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/30/pro-
or-con-lobbying-thrived (explaining that lobbying helps parties on both sides of the aisle). 
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influencing,249 PI gathering remains unregulated.250  The Lobbying 
Disclosure Act (LDA) requires exhaustive reporting for persons who 
send information or opinions to Capitol Hill with an objective of 
influencing legislation.251  Yet merely asking questions to receive 
information is not considered “lobbying,” and thus is not within the 
ambit of the LDA.252 
PI firms primarily sell their services to hedge funds, which possess 
both the capital and human resources to convert tips and predictions 
into profits.253  Hedge funds “pursue high-risk, high-yield investments 
for wealthy clients”254 and were created as an outgrowth of the 
Investment Company Act (“ICA”).  The ICA prohibits mutual funds 
with over 500 investors from leveraging more than twenty-five percent 
of its stock portfolio; this creates an opportunity for investment 
companies with less than 500 investors to leverage up to fifty percent 
of the purchase price of a stock, allowing these companies to take 
greater risks and potentially reap greater profits.255  PI is valuable to 
hedge funds because they tend to hold assets for only a brief period of 
time.256  Thus, hedge funds have been robust consumers of PI and have 
                                               
 249. Lobbyists must provide quarterly reports that includes “a list of the specific 
issues upon which a lobbyist employed by the registrant engaged in lobbying activities, 
including, to the maximum extent practicable, a list of bill numbers and references to 
specific executive branch actions . . . .”  2 U.S.C. § 1604(b). 
 250. See Javers, supra note 2, at 42; see also Opinion Desk, Political Intelligence Panel 
Discussion Concludes with Recognized Need for Increased Disclosure of Non-Public Material 
Collection and Use, BUS. WIRE (June 12, 2012, 8:00 AM), http://www.businesswire.com/ 
news/home/20120612005322/en/Political-Intelligence-Panel-Discussion-Concludes-
Recognized-Increased (stating that several members of the PI industry had a discussion 
about defining the industry, the potential need for additional regulation, and whether 
PI members should be required to register as lobbyists). 
 251. Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-65, §§ 3, 5, 109 Stat. 691, 692, 
697 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 1602(8)(A), 1604). 
 252. 2 U.S.C. § 1602 (8)(B). 
 253. See Mullins & Scannell, supra note 1. 
 254. See id. (explaining that hedge funds buy and sell company stock based on PI 
before that information is widely known). 
 255. See ROBERT W. HAMILTON & RICHARD A. BOOTH, CORPORATE FINANCE:  CASES AND 
MATERIALS 358–59 (4th ed. 1984) (explaining how the Federal Reserve Board’s rules 
limit investors from purchasing stock on margin and its consequence on the formation 
of various investment firms). 
 256. “What sets hedge funds apart is their ability to act instantly on news and to 
employ trading options that allow them to make money whether stocks rise or fall.”  
Jensen et al., supra note 253. 
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successfully used PI to make informed decisions on their portfolio 
positions, yielding bountiful profits.257 
B.  The STOCK Act 
On April 4, 2012, President Barack Obama signed into law the 
STOCK Act, which contained several new provisions addressing 
congressional insider trading and PI.258  First, the Act conferred a 
fiduciary duty upon all public employees and prohibits members of 
Congress and other federal employees from trading material, 
nonpublic information.259  Second, the Act provided an affirmative 
duty for a “covered government person”260 to publicize within forty-five 
days any purchase or sale of “stocks, bonds, commodity-futures, or 
other securities.”261  Third, the STOCK Act called for the Comptroller 
General, who leads the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and 
the Congressional Research Service to conduct a research study on the 
practice of selling PI.262  Fourth, the STOCK Act prohibited covered 
persons from purchasing securities that are the subject of an initial 
public offering.263 
                                               
 257. For example, the Wall Street Journal reported that Paul Equale, a consultant for 
Gerson Lehrman Group Inc., a PI firm, attended a gathering for former Senate 
Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV), where he spoke with two of the Senator’s leading 
supporters who confirmed it would be politically inconvenient for the Senator to allow 
a bill benefiting the gambling industry to move forward.  Mr. Equale then allegedly 
passed the information on to a hedge fund who was able to factor that information 
into its position on MGM Resorts International shares.  Brody Mullins & Susan Pulliam, 
Hedge Funds Pay Top Dollar for Washington Intelligence, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 4, 2011), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111904070604576514791591319306. 
 258. See Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, Statement by the Press 
Secretary on S. 2038 (Apr. 4, 2012), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2012/04/04/statement-press-secretary-s-2038 (discussing the main provisions of the 
STOCK Act and reaffirming President Obama’s commitment to government ethics reform). 
 259. Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-105, 
§ 4(g)(1), 126 Stat. 291, 292 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1).  But see Sung Hui 
Kim, The Last Temptation of Congress:  Legislator Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Norm 
Against Corruption, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 845, 870 (2013) (analogizing the legislator-
citizen relationship to a fiduciary relationship and arguing that the STOCK Act did 
not substantially change the state of insider trading for legislators). 
 260. Pub. L. No. 112-105, § 18, 126 Stat. 291, 304 (including members and employees 
of the executive branch and legislative branch as “covered government persons”). 
 261. Id. § 6, 126 Stat. at 293 (setting the reporting requirements after receiving 
notice of any transaction under section 102(a)(5)(B) and section 101). 
 262. Id. § 7(a), 126 Stat. at 294–95 (requiring that the PI Report include a discussion 
of six items enumerated in the act). 
 263. Id. § 12, 126 Stat. at 300. 
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At a time when opinion polls ranked Americans’ faith in public 
institutions at a record low, the STOCK Act was a common-sense 
political decision for legislators and the President.264  The STOCK Act 
was a reaction to a series of scandals where the public learned of 
congressional members’ alleged insider trading resulting from PI;265 
however, no prosecutions arose from these scandals.266  The bill passed 
with only two “no” votes in the House and three in the Senate.267  The 
STOCK Act passed with great fanfare, yet it did little to change the 
business of selling or tipping off analysts to the inner-workings and 
nonpublic deliberations of the government.268  The purpose of the Act 
is two-fold:  (1) to prevent congressional, judicial, and executive officers 
from executing trades based off of material, nonpublic information 
                                               
 264. Walsh, supra note 9. 
 265. See, e.g., 60 Minutes, Congress:  Trading Stock on Inside Information?, CBS NEWS 
(Nov. 13, 2011), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/congress-trading-stock-on-inside-
information (describing Speaker John Boehner’s (R-OH) and Representative Nancy 
Pelosi’s (D-CA) well-timed and insightful stock purchases during the debate on the 
Affordable Care Act and 2008 legislation affecting major credit card companies); 
James Grimaldi & Michelle Hackman, Donald Trump’s Pick for Health Secretary Traded 
Medical Stocks While in House, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 22, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/donald-trumps-pick-for-health-secretary-traded-medical-stocks-while-in-house-
1482451061 (discussing insider trading of Congressman Spencer Bachus (R-AL), who 
made $28,000 from over 200 trades). 
 266. See Amber Phillips, Why One Expert Says Tom Price’s Stock Deals May Very Well Have 
Broken the Law, WASH. POST (Jan 18. 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
the-fix/wp/2017/01/18/why-one-expert-says-tom-prices-stock-deals-may-very-well-
have-broken-the-law (stating that the STOCK Act has yet to yield any congressional 
prosecutions). 
 267. See Press Release, U.S. Congressman Tim Walz, Walz STOCK Act Passes House 
(Feb. 9, 2012), https://walz.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/walz-stock-act-
passes-house (commenting that the passing of the STOCK Act was long overdue); 
Seung Min Kim, House Approves Insider Trading Ban, POLITICO (Feb. 9, 2012), 
www.politico.com/story/1012/02/house-approves-insider-trading-ban-072670. 
 268. Austin, supra note 240, at 270 (arguing that although the STOCK Act was 
necessary to clarify the issue of Congress’s fiduciary duty, it allows too many loopholes 
and does not provide any proper enforcement mechanisms due to the lack of access 
to trading information); see also Paul D. Brachman, Note, Outlawing Honest Graft, 16 
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 261, 283–97 (2013) (discussing how the U.S. 
Constitution’s Speech and Debate Clause will frustrate investigations of illicit trading 
by congressional members); Tamara Keith, How Congress Quietly Overhauled Its Insider-
Trading Law, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Apr. 16, 2013, 5:12 PM), http://www.npr.org/ 
sections/itsallpolitics/2013/04/16/177496734/how-congress-quietly-overhauled-its-
insider-trading-law (discussing the legislators’ 2013 amendment to the STOCK ACT, 
made in response to security risks that decreased transparency). 
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derived from their government jobs and (2) to identify the PI industry to 
establish a foundation for potential future legislation and regulations.269 
The STOCK Act contributed two new developments to the PI 
industry.  First, although the law does not formally regulate the 
industry, it does acknowledge its existence by calling for the 
Comptroller General to conduct a research study to discover its 
prevalence within the government.270  In particular, Congress was 
concerned about the practice of selling material, nonpublic 
information to securities analysts.271  The study yielded several 
conclusions from the GAO, including that the GAO could not discern 
the extent of the sale of PI to investors.272  The GAO, having only found 
two examples during the fourteen interviews with intelligence firms, 
could not articulate the full extent of investors’ reliance on PI to make 
investing decisions.273  PI gathered using insider tactics—such as private 
conversations and correspondence—is bundled with other publicly 
accessible information and sold to investors.274  Also, financial 
compensation from investor-clients to PI firms is usually not tied to a 
specific tip but rather to long-term analysis of an entire industrial sector.275  
Thus, the GAO study does not fully address congressional concerns. 
Second, the STOCK Act explicitly imputes a fiduciary duty to 
members of Congress and government employees.276  This 
                                               
 269. Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-105, §§ 2–
3, 7, 9, 126 Stat. 291, 291–92, 295, 297 (to be codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). 
 270. Pub. L. No. 112-105, § 7, 126 Stat. 291, 294–95; see GAO REPORT, supra 
note 241, at 1 (outlining the objectives for the GAO study into the relationship 
between political intelligence and the financial market). 
 271. GAO REPORT, supra note 241, at 1 (“The STOCK Act directed GAO to study 
the role of political intelligence in the financial markets . . . [and] the extent to which 
investors rely on such information . . . .”). 
 272. See id. at 8 (highlighting the difficulty in determining the extent of the sales 
due to the bundling of information and lack of consensus on the definition of PI). 
 273. See id. (noting that, even though quantifying the prevalence of these sales is 
extremely difficult, there are two examples of investors using political information). 
 274. Id. at 4. 
 275. Id. at 8, 11. 
 276. See Pub. L. No. 112-105, § 4(g)(1), 126 Stat. 291, 292, which states: 
[E]ach member of Congress or employee of Congress owes a duty arising from 
a relationship of trust and confidence to the Congress, the [U.S.] 
Government, and the citizens of the United States with respect to material, 
nonpublic information derived from such person’s position as a Member of 
Congress or employee of Congress or gained from the performance of such 
person’s official responsibilities. 
Similar language exists for judicial and executive branch employees in a subsequent 
section of the STOCK Act.  Id. § 9(a)(1)–(3), 126 Stat. at 297. 
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development is significant because insider trading under the classical 
theory is predicated on a breach of a fiduciary duty.277  It extends the 
reach of the misappropriation theory to outsiders who acquire 
material, nonpublic government information from their employers, 
such as law firms or consultants who contract with the government.278 
V.  HOW SALMAN AND THE STOCK ACT IMPACT THE PI INDUSTRY 
A.  The PI Industry’s Use of Personal Connections May Violate  
Insider Trading Laws 
After the Salman decision, which reaffirmed Dirks’s expansive 
personal gains test, and the STOCK Act, some of the PI firms’ practices 
may constitute insider trading and violate Rule 10b-5.  PI operatives 
who communicate with government officials to gather material, 
nonpublic information may be impermissibly leveraging their personal 
connections with government officials to gain information.279  
Typically, PI operatives are lobbyists and/or lawyers who previously 
worked for the government and maintain close ties with their former 
co-workers or have other influences over legislators.280  If a tippee 
knows, or should have known, that there has been a breach of a 
fiduciary duty and there is a personal benefit to the tipper, then any 
                                               
 277. Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 34,6668, 40 SEC Docket 907, 
911–12 (Nov. 8, 1961) (holding that the defendants breached their fiduciary duty to 
the corporation’s stockholders when they traded on material, nonpublic information 
because the information was property of the company); see also Martha L. Cochran et 
al., STOCK Act Expands Insider Trading Liability:  Communicating with Government Officials 
Carries New Risks, ARNOLD & PORTER 1 (Apr. 2012), https://www.apks.com/~/media/ 
files/perspectives/publications/2012/04/stock-act-expands-insider-trading-liability-
comm__/files/newsletter-item/fileattachment/advisory-stock_act_expands_insider_ 
trading_liabi__.pdf (advising clients to be wary of communications with public officials). 
 278. Sara Almousa, Comment, Friends with Benefits?  Clarifying the Role Relationships 
Play in Satisfying the Personal Benefit Requirement Under Tipper-Tippee Liability, 23 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 1251, 1258–59 (2016) (discussing the expansive application of the 
misappropriation theory through the Supreme Court’s endorsement of the theory in 
O’Hagan, where a law firm partner violated a duty of trust and confidence, resulting in 
the SEC introducing Rule 10-b). 
 279. See Alexandra Stevenson & Matthew Goldstein, Insider-Trading Case Ensnares 
Hedge Fund, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/ 
24/business/dealbook/five-accused-of-trading-illegally-on-health-policy-leaks.html 
(discussing the investigation into a Washington consultant for selling to a hedge fund 
material, nonpublic information that he received from a friend at the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid services). 
 280. See supra notes 247–50 and accompanying text. 
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material, nonpublic information must be disclosed before trading a 
security.281  To analyze the impact of the STOCK Act and the personal 
gains test after Salman, this Part uses a hypothetical political operative 
(the “Operative”) employed at one of the fourteen PI firms interviewed 
by the GAO.282  With that hypothetical Operative in mind, this Part 
explores those factors that may point to a PI operative realizing a 
judicially cognizable personal gain on a government tipper. 
Our Operative worked for four years as a legislative assistant for a 
member of Congress and another four years as a senior staffer with the 
Senate Banking Committee.  The Operative is a graduate of a 
prestigious Washington, D.C., law school and holds a lofty partnership 
at a global law firm.  The Operative resides in Potomac, Maryland, 
where the Operative also serves as an officer of the Congressional 
Country Club.  With this pedigree, what additional circumstances might 
draw the Operative within the ambit of 10b-5?  Moreover, when might 
a hedge fund that acted on information from the Operative be liable?283 
To determine whether tipper-tippee liability applies, a court will 
apply the four-step test in Dirks.284  In the hypothetical situation, a court 
would need to first determine whether the government official (the 
“Official”), breached a fiduciary duty and disclosed material, 
nonpublic information to the Operative.285  Second, a court would 
need to decide whether the Official received a personal benefit from 
the Operative.286  Third, a court would ask whether the Operative 
knew, or should have known, about the Official’s breach of fiduciary 
duty.287  Fourth, a court would ask whether the Operative used the 
information in connection with a securities transaction.288 
The Operative would have to obtain material, nonpublic 
information in breach of a fiduciary duty.289  In the context of PI, 
                                               
 281. See Cady, 40 SEC Docket at 911 (concluding that the only way to cure the harm 
was for the possessor of the material, nonpublic information to disclose the 
information before trading on it); supra notes 80–83 and accompanying text. 
 282. See GAO REPORT, supra note 241, at 2 (discussing how the GAO conducted its 
study by interviewing several PI firms to obtain information about the PI industry). 
 283. Although this hypothetical uses a hedge fund as an example, the analysis would 
be the same for any person or entity trading any type of security with PI.  See supra 
notes 30–34 and accompanying text (describing the elements of a security). 
 284. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 285. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663 (1983). 
 286. Id. 
 287. Id. at 665–66. 
 288. Id. at 666–67. 
 289. See id. at 663–64. 
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public information includes anything the public can view, listen to, or 
read, including public hearings on Capitol Hill or public documents.290  
Further, even if a government official breaches fiduciary duty and 
intentionally disseminates confidential information to the public, 
trading on such information is permissible because the information is 
public.291  Therefore, the Operative must first receive nonpublic 
information, likely through private conversations and correspondence,292 
to be liable for insider trading. 
Next, the Official must breach a fiduciary duty in communicating 
the information to the Operative.293  Although the existence of this 
duty may have been disputed prior to the STOCK Act,294 the statute 
imposes a fiduciary duty on government officials.295  Therefore, if the 
other elements of Dirks’s first prong are satisfied—namely, tipping 
material, nonpublic information—then a fiduciary duty is expressly 
breached because the STOCK Act requires covered persons to 
safeguard material, nonpublic information.296 
Further, to satisfy the remaining element within the first prong, the 
Official must tip material information to the Operative.297  Material 
information is information that a reasonable investor would want to 
know before investing; further, it must add to the “total-mix” of 
                                               
 290. See supra note 45 (explaining the difference between public and nonpublic 
information within the context of securities laws). 
 291. Once a statement is made public, the court will assume, via the efficient market 
hypothesis, that the information is priced into the market.  See Halliburton Co. v. Erica 
P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2405 (2014) (affirming the presumption of the 
efficient market theory, which theorizes that a stock price “reflects all public material 
information—including material misstatements”). 
 292. See supra note 244 and accompanying text (discussing various ways in which PI 
can be obtained). 
 293. See supra notes 80–83. 
 294. See Lawrence Greenberg, A Proposal for Abolishing Congressional Insider Trading, 
MOTLEY FOOL (Jan. 30, 2012), https://www.fool.com/investing/general/2012/ 
01/30/a-proposal-for-abolishing-congressional-insider-tr.aspx (acknowledging that 
some experts believe that a duty of trust and confidence and prohibition against 
insider trading existed prior to the STOCK act). 
 295. “[E]ach Member of Congress or employee of Congress owes a duty arising 
from a relationship of trust and confidence to the Congress, the [U.S.] Government, 
and the citizens of the United States with respect to material, nonpublic 
information . . . .”  Pub. L. No. 112-105, § 4(g)(1), 126 Stat 291, 292. 
 296. All covered persons must not disclose “material, nonpublic information 
derived from such person’s position [in the Government] or gained from the 
performance of such person’s official responsibilities.”  Id. 
 297. See supra note 285 and accompanying text. 
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publicly available information.298  Prosecuting a single tip is often 
problematic because the tip may be insufficient by itself to satisfy the 
materiality requirement.299  When the information is paired with other 
tips, however, the Operative can draw a material inference that may 
yield a rich trading tip.300 
The second Dirks prong requires the Official to realize a personal 
benefit in exchange for the material, nonpublic information.301  
Obviously, if the Operative pays the Official for the insider 
information, then this prong is satisfied.302  However, if the Official 
provided the information to the Operative without a 
contemporaneous pecuniary exchange, the analysis examines the 
totality of the circumstances between the Operative and the Official to 
determine whether a close friendship exists.303  Given the Operative’s 
background, the Official may have shared prior employment, a 
collegiate connection, or traveled in similar social circles. 
What if the Official currently works for the Senate Banking 
Committee and was also employed by that Committee when the 
Operative worked there?  Would that relationship by itself be sufficient 
to infer a personal benefit?  Probably not.  Here, the Official and the 
Operative have a prior co-worker relationship, but unlike the 
relationship in Yun, in which the tipper and tippee relied on each 
                                               
 298. See supra note 44 (defining materiality). 
 299. See GAO REPORT, supra note 241; Mullins & Scannell, supra note 1 (explaining 
how traders were able to reap millions in profits through knowing about an upcoming 
government announcement).  But see Stevenson & Goldstein, supra note 279 (where 
alleged single tips were sold as “consulting fees” to a hedge fund). 
 300. An example of this materiality problem in the asbestos trading scheme 
scenario, see Javers, supra note 2, at 42, would be if the PI Operative received four tips 
from different tippers.  Hypothetically, one tip may be that legislation of “some sort” 
is under consideration.  A second tip may be that the Senate Majority Leader has an 
announcement scheduled for the following day.  A third tip may be that an asbestos 
expert was seen leaving Capitol Hill, and a fourth tip could be that a $20 billion liability 
fund of “some kind” was being created.  Like parts of a puzzle, each tip contains a part 
of the picture that is unintelligible, and thus not material by itself, but when pieced 
together with all of the other puzzle pieces, the picture becomes cognizable. 
 301. See supra note 284 and accompanying text. 
 302. For example, in United States v. Whitman, 115 F. Supp. 3d 439, 446 (S.D.N.Y. 
2015), a tipper “demanded somewhere in the range of $100,000 to $200,000” per 
trading tip.  The court concluded that this was tantamount of a “classic example[] of 
an actual . . . quid pro quo” exchange in violation of the personal gains requirement. 
 303. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983) (acknowledging that “determining 
whether an insider personally benefits from a particular disclosure . . . will not always 
be easy for courts”); see also supra Part III and accompanying text. 
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other for profits and advancement,304 the Official and the Operative 
no longer work together.  However, if the Official is a member of 
Congress and the Operative routinely organizes fundraising events for 
Congress, then a quid pro quo scenario similar to Sargent may exist.  In 
Sargent, the court found a quid pro quo when the parties aided each 
other with patient referrals and help with the chamber of commerce.305  
Further, a personal gain in connection with a tip no longer needs to 
be immediate; the promise of future fundraising by the Operative for 
the Official would likely suffice.306 
Next, what if the Operative and the Official shared their college 
years together at the same institution?  While collegiate relationships 
can be a strong indicator of a quid pro quo or gifting relationship,307 
the mere coincidence of being on campus at the same time is 
insufficient to infer a close relationship.308  Instead, a court will 
examine the nature and depth of the parties’ relationship.309  If, as in 
Evans and Clay Capital, the Operative and the Official communicated 
regularly and met socially over the years, a disclosure that was 
subsequently traded on would likely be an illicit gift to a friend.310  
Evans amplified this point by noting that college roommates, even 
those entering different professions, can spawn relationships that 
create similar stations in life.311  Consequently, a personal gain may be 
inferred from a reasonable expectation on the part of one individual 
                                               
 304. Supra notes 182–87 and accompanying text (explaining that Donna Yun and 
Jerry Burch were friendly, worked together for years, and split commissions on various 
real estate transactions). 
 305. Supra notes 198–206 and accompanying text. 
 306. See supra notes 176–81 (applying a totality-of-the-circumstances approach to 
examine a personal benefit exchange between a tipper and a tippee). 
 307. See supra notes 231–33 and accompanying text. 
 308. See Sara Almousa, supra note 278, at 1263–64 (holding that the career advice 
was insufficient to establish a benefit and was rather “merely an ‘encouragement one 
would generally expect of a fellow alumnus or casual acquaintance’”). 
 309. See supra notes 203–10 (reviewing Clay Capital and Rajaratnam, in which the courts 
considered the nature and extent of personal relationships between tipper and tippee). 
 310. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983) (holding that a personal benefit is 
satisfied when the tipper “inten[ds] to benefit the . . . recipient . . . resembl[ing] 
trading by the insider himself”); United States v. Evans, 486 F.3d 315, 319 (7th Cir. 
2007) (affirming the jury’s decision that meeting in college and talking daily on the 
phone and e-mail are sufficient facts to find a personal gain); supra note 205 and 
accompanying text (commenting that the parties in Clay Capital exchanged over fifty 
phone calls during the tip-giving period). 
 311. SEC v. Maxwell, 341 F. Supp. 2d 941, 948 (S.D. Ohio 2004). 
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that a favor will be returned in the future—a quid pro quo.312  
Therefore, collegiate relationships should raise cautionary flags. 
Finally, what if the Operative and the Official were both members of 
the same country club?  Where objective circumstances point to a 
friendship outside of the workplace, courts do not hesitate to put the 
question to a jury.313  If the Operative and the Official golf together 
routinely and attend club social events, their relationship may be 
analogous to the tipper and tippee in Bray who socialized together and 
exchanged favors.314  Therefore, 10b-5 liability may attach if the factual 
circumstances indicate a close social relationship. 
The third Dirks prong—whether the tippee should have known of 
the breach—involves consideration of whether the tip was nonpublic 
information.  The STOCK Act places the public on notice that 
government employees owe a fiduciary duty to the government and 
the American people; therefore, the Operative knows, or should know, 
that the Official is breaching a duty.315  The knowledge element turns 
on the issue of whether the tippee knew that the information was 
nonpublic.316  If the Operative knows that the information is 
nonpublic, then the Operative also knows, or should know, that the 
Official breached a fiduciary duty. 
The fourth Dirks prong is satisfied only if the information that the 
Operative obtains is used “in connection with” securities trading.317  
Here, if the Operative personally trades on the information, this element 
                                               
 312. United States v. Riley, 90 F. Supp. 3d 176, 184 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (explaining that 
the personal benefit does not need to be immediate, but rather that the tip must lead 
to the benefit, now or in the future). 
 313. United States v. Bray, 853 F.3d 18, 22, 27 (1st Cir. 2017) (finding that there was 
a “plausible” close relationship between two people who had met in college and 
maintained a social relationship). 
 314. Id. at 27 (affirming the conviction of the defendant because the tipper an 
tippee were members of the same golf club, “dined with each other at local bars and 
restaurants, and even took each other’s counsel”); see supra notes 215–18 and 
accompanying text. 
 315. For a discussion on public notice, see generally Joseph E. Murphy, The Duty of 
the Government to Make the Law Known, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 255, 257–63 (1982), which 
states that once a bill has been signed into law and published, the public is presumed 
to be on notice. 
 316. The STOCK Act requires that all covered persons must not disclose “material, 
nonpublic information” (emphasis added).  Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act 
of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-105, § 4, 126 Stat. 291, 292 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1). 
 317. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012) (requiring that the fraud or deceit occur “in 
connection with” the purchase or sale of a security). 
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is satisfied.318  On the other hand, if the Operative sells the information to 
someone who does not trade on it, insider trading liability does not attach 
to the Operative.319  Of course, PI firms service hedge funds and hedge 
funds buy and sell securities.320  Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude 
that PI firms knowingly transmit nonpublic information to entities that 
satisfy the “in connection with” requirement.321 
B.  New Compliance Challenges for Hedge Funds that Consume PI 
A hedge fund may have insider trading liability if it knew, or should 
have known, that the Operative satisfied the Dirks prongs.  But given 
the bundling of PI from multiple sources and the burden of proving 
that the hedge fund knew its information was gathered impermissibly, 
finding knowledge is a high hurdle. 
First, proving materiality is problematic because PI firms allegedly do 
not sell single tips, choosing instead to bundle the information gained 
from many sources into a single product, usually a monthly update.322  
Such bundling makes it difficult for prosecutors to establish that any 
one piece of information is material because it was embedded in a 
“mosaic of public information.”323  Each assertion may be either 
nonmaterial in and of itself or based on publicly available information; 
however, those pieces of information in the aggregate could provide a 
trading tip.324  Nevertheless, if the government can prove that material, 
nonpublic information was embedded within the product, then an 
                                               
 318. See supra notes 56–60 (discussing corporate insider fiduciary duties to the company). 
 319. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). 
 320. See Javers, supra note 2 (explaining that the hedge fund industry consumes PI 
because hedge funds short-sell stocks and can leverage their positions for greater profits). 
 321. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). 
 322. See GAO REPORT, supra note 241, at 11 (describing how several of the PI firms 
interviewed by the GAO predominately sell their information as newsletters, hourly 
rates as services provided, or upfront fees).  But see Stevenson & Goldstein, supra 
note 279 (alleging that single tips were sold as “consulting fees” to a hedge fund). 
 323. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Just Tidbits, or Material Facts for Insider Trading?, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 29, 2010, 8:56 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/11/29/just-
tidbits-or-material-facts-for-insider-trading. 
 324. Id. (“[T]he mosaic theory is that each individual piece of information is 
nonmaterial by itself:  an individual piece of information would not move the price of 
the security if disseminated in a public press release.  Taken together, however, the 
bits of information can form a meaningful mosaic.”).  For another example of the 
mosaic theory, see supra note 300. 
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insider trading violation may be proved because the law prohibits all 
trades that utilize material, nonpublic information in breach of a duty.325 
Second, the government must prove that the hedge fund knew, or 
should have known, that the PI firm employed impermissible practices 
to gather the illicit material, nonpublic information.326  This also 
presents a challenge for prosecutors because some PI firms have 
disavowed insider tactics.327  Such statements would provide hedge 
funds with a safe harbor to argue that it believed that the information 
was legally obtained.328  But a PI firm’s disclaimer may not afford any 
protection if there is evidence that a hedge fund had actual knowledge 
of illicit methods used to obtain PI.329  Thus, it would be wise for hedge 
funds who consume PI to limit their communications with their PI 
agents to only the final product, which ideally would contain both a 
disclaimer and a statement of sources and methods.  Finally, the longer 
                                               
 325. See United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139, 159–60 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding 
that Rule 10b-5 does not require reliance upon material, nonpublic information for a 
trade, but merely possession of material, nonpublic information while executing a 
purchase or sale of a security). 
 326. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 427 (2016) (“[T]o establish a 
defendant’s criminal liability as a tippee, [the government] must prove that the tippee 
knew that the tipper breached a duty—in other words, that the tippee knew that the 
tipper disclosed the information for a personal benefit and that the tipper expected 
trading to ensue.”); see supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 327. See Brody Mullins, Regulatory Scrutiny Transforms Washington’s Political-Intelligence 
Business, WALL ST. J. (June 19, 2014, 8:53 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
regulatory-scrutiny-transforms-washingtons-political-intelligence-business-1403223675 
(“Today, instead of seeking information from congressional aides or agency officials, 
Mr. Vogel’s firm aims to arrive at policy predictions based on publicly available metrics, 
such as campaign donations, lobbying expenditures, congressional voting records and 
polling data.”).  But see Brody Mullins & Aruna Viswanatha, The King of ‘Political 
Intelligence’ Faces a Reckoning, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 8, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
the-king-of-political-intelligence-faces-a-reckoning-1471530464 (describing how as late 
as 2016, David Blaszczak, a PI operative, would gather Centers of Medicare and 
Medicaid Services information by leveraging his personal connections with his former 
agency, and sell the information to hedge funds such as Visium Asset Management for 
steep trading profits). 
 328. See Stephen Madsen, How to Avoid the Pitfalls of Expert Networking, LAW360 (Apr. 
20, 2011), https://www.cravath.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Publications/ 
3281473_1.pdf (recommending that clients who retain expert networks should “ask 
the expert to confirm that the information can be provided without violating 
obligations of confidentiality”). 
 329. See United States v. Martoma, 869 F.3d 58, 61–62 (2017) (affirming the 
defendant’s conviction even though the defendant received a representation in the 
consultant’s contract stating that the consultant was “not to disclose any confidential 
information in a consultation”). 
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and more attenuated the tipper-tippee chain, the greater the challenge 
in showing a link between the hedge fund and the tipper.330 
CONCLUSION 
Courts consistently ratify the SEC’s core mission to ferret out 
fraudsters who undermine the integrity of the markets.  Salman 
continued this jurisprudence by reaffirming the Dirks personal gain 
test.  Salman recognized that the personal gain test is an inherently fact-
intensive inquiry because human relationships are intrinsically 
complex.  Yet this fact-intensive inquiry is not esoteric; the courts have 
developed a workable framework to analyze whether the objective facts 
of the case demonstrate a meaningfully close personal relationship—
an important due process protection.  Accordingly, an inquiry cannot 
be reduced to a formulaic test and instead should be left for a judge or 
jury to determine when a tipper realizes a personal gain.  Finally, as 
district courts continue to grapple with the contours of personal 
relationships, this Comment attempts to provide a guide for prosecutors 
and practitioners to understand the current state of the law. 
Salman’s reaffirmation of the Dirks personal gain requirement was 
limited in scope and preserved due process protections for the 
accused. In contrast, the Second Circuit’s decision in Martoma is 
inconsistent with Dirks and effectively eliminates the personal gain 
requirement.  It allows prosecutors to prove merely that a defendant 
provided a tip intended for the recipient to trade upon it, opening the 
door for prosecutors utilizing circumstantial evidence to prove guilt.  
The Dirks personal gain requirement imposed an objective test to provide 
a necessary counterweight to governmental powers.  Moreover, because 
federal securities laws are a creature of judicial decisions, courts should be 
hesitant to eliminate protections for the accused. 
Additionally, Congress should revisit the STOCK Act because it is 
woefully inadequate in providing the requisite tools for SEC and DOJ 
investigators to carry out their mandates and enforce the law.  
Nevertheless, the STOCK Act brought attention to an underground 
and shameful truth concerning our government.  Namely, that too 
many government insiders are using their positions of power for their 
own personal profit.  Further, the STOCK Act’s explicit 
announcement that government workers owe a fiduciary duty to the 
American people places government officials on notice that insider 
                                               
 330. See Gevurtz, supra note 102, at 19–22 (discussing the increased difficulty in 
convicting a tippee when a trading tip spans multiple persons). 
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trading laws do apply to them and that the transmission of insider 
information to others can be prosecuted. 
Therefore, the PI industry should disavow insider-only tactics used 
to gather PI and instead rely upon only publicly available data and 
information.  The STOCK Act was a clear warning sign to the PI 
industry to conform or subject themselves to liability.  Moreover, for 
those firms who continue to gamble and use insider-only tactics after 
the STOCK Act, Salman places those firms within the crosshairs of 
10b-5.  Hedge funds and other consumers of PI should question their 
PI operatives’ tactics and ensure that they comport with the law.  
Accordingly, it would be prudent for hedge funds that utilize PI to 
inform investment analysts to request a statement from their operatives 
attesting to the methods employed to obtain PI.  Otherwise, their 
fund’s assets may be at risk due to a PI operative’s personal relationship 
with a government official. 
 
